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(Dis)honesty and the Value of Transparency for Campaign Promises

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  • Matthias Lang

    (LMU Munich)

  • Simeon Schudy

    (LMU Munich)

Abstract

Promise competition is prevalent in many economic environments, but promise keeping is often difficult to observe. We study the value of transparency for promise competition and ask whether promises still offer an opportunity to honor future obligations when outcomes do not allow for observing promise keeping. Focusing on campaign promises, we show theoretically how preferences for truth-telling shape promise competition when promise keeping can(not) be observed and identify the causal effects of transparency in an incentivized experiment. Transparency leads to less promise breaking but also to less generous promises. Rent appropriations are higher in opaque institutions though only weakly so when not fully opaque. Instrumental reputational concerns and preferences for truth-telling explain these results.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthias Lang & Simeon Schudy, 2023. "(Dis)honesty and the Value of Transparency for Campaign Promises," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 409, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    • Handle: RePEc:rco:dpaper:409
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    campaign promises; promise breaking; voting; lying costs; preferences for truth-telling; political Economy; theory; experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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