Matthias Lang

Personal Details

First Name:	Matthias
Middle Name:
Last Name:	Lang
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	pla548
	[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
	https://lang.userweb.mwn.de/
Terminal Degree:	2012 Wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Fachbereich; Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

(1%) CESifo

München, Germany
https://www.cesifo.org/
RePEc:edi:cesifde (more details at EDIRC)

(99%) Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

München, Germany
http://www.vwl.uni-muenchen.de/
RePEc:edi:vfmunde (more details at EDIRC)

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

1. Matthias Lang, 2021. "Stochastic Contracts and Subjective Evaluations," CESifo Working Paper Series 9458, CESifo.
   • Matthias Lang, 2023. "Stochastic contracts and subjective evaluations," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(1), pages 104-134, March.
   • Lang, Matthias, 2022. "Stochastic Contracts and Subjective Evaluations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 329, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.

   Cited by:

   1. Ishiguro, Shingo & Yasuda, Yosuke, 2023. "Moral hazard and subjective evaluation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).

2. Matthias Lang & Simeon Schudy, 2020. "(Dis)honesty and the Value of Transparency for Campaign Promises," CESifo Working Paper Series 8366, CESifo.
   • Lang, Matthias & Schudy, Simeon, 2023. "(Dis)honesty and the value of transparency for campaign promises," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
   • Matthias Lang & Simeon Schudy, 2023. "(Dis)honesty and the Value of Transparency for Campaign Promises," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 409, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.

   Cited by:

   1. Sorravich Kingsuwankul & Chloe Tergiman & Marie Claire Villeval, 2023. "Why do oaths work? Image concerns and credibility in promise keeping," Working Papers 2316, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
      • Sorravich Kingsuwankul & Chloe Tergiman & Marie Claire Villeval, 2023. "Why do oaths work? Image concerns and credibility in promise keeping," Working Papers hal-04209489, HAL.

3. Matthias Lang, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Narratives," CESifo Working Paper Series 8502, CESifo.

   Cited by:

   1. Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch & Roland Strausz, 2023. "Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers 0030, Berlin School of Economics.

4. Helmut Bester & Matthias Lang & Jianpei Li, 2018. "Signaling versus Auditing," CESifo Working Paper Series 7183, CESifo.
   • Helmut Bester & Matthias Lang & Jianpei Li, 2021. "Signaling versus Auditing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(4), pages 859-883, December.
   • Bester, Helmut & Lang, Matthias & Li, Jianpei, 2021. "Signaling versus Auditing," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 286, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.

   Cited by:

   1. Mehmet Ekmekci & Nenad Kos, 2020. "Signaling Covertly Acquired Information," Working Papers 658, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
   2. Nicolás Figueroa & Carla Guadalupi, 2020. "Testing the sender: When signaling is not enough," Documentos de Trabajo 547, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
      • Figueroa, Nicolás & Guadalupi, Carla, 2021. "Testing the sender: When signaling is not enough," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).

5. Bester, Helmut & Lang, Matthias & Li, Jianpei, 2018. "Signaling versus costly information acquisition," Discussion Papers 2018/11, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.

   Cited by:

   1. Rehbeck, John, 2023. "Revealed Bayesian expected utility with limited data," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 207(C), pages 81-95.

6. Matthias Lang, 2016. "Legal Uncertainty as a Welfare Enhancing Screen," CESifo Working Paper Series 6164, CESifo.
   • Lang, Matthias, 2017. "Legal uncertainty as a welfare enhancing screen," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 274-289.
   • Matthias Lang, 2014. "Legal Uncertainty as a Welfare Enhancing Screen," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_17, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Oct 2016.

   Cited by:

   1. Stéphane Gauthier & Guy Laroque, 2022. "Optimal random taxation and redistribution," IFS Working Papers W22/35, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
      • Stéphane Gauthier & Guy Laroque, 2022. "Optimal Random Taxation and Redistribution," Working Papers hal-03915336, HAL.
      • Stéphane Gauthier & Guy Laroque, 2022. "Optimal Random Taxation and Redistribution," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03915336, HAL.
   2. Matthias Lang, 2021. "Stochastic Contracts and Subjective Evaluations," CESifo Working Paper Series 9458, CESifo.
      • Lang, Matthias, 2022. "Stochastic Contracts and Subjective Evaluations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 329, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
      • Matthias Lang, 2023. "Stochastic contracts and subjective evaluations," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(1), pages 104-134, March.
   3. Sven Hoeppner & Laura Lyhs, 2016. "Behavior Under Vague Standards: Evidence from the Laboratory," Jena Economics Research Papers 2016-010, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
   4. Fiocco, Raffaele & Guo, Dongyu, 2020. "Regulatory risk, vertical integration, and upstream investment," MPRA Paper 97960, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Fiocco, Raffaele & Guo, Dongyu, 2020. "Regulatory risk, vertical integration, and upstream investment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
   5. Berno Buechel & Eberhard Feess & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2018. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Sophisticated and Naive Offenders," CESifo Working Paper Series 7106, CESifo.
      • Buechel, Berno & Feess, Eberhard & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2020. "Optimal law enforcement with sophisticated and naïve offenders," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 836-857.
   6. Kusi-Sarpong, Simonov & Orji, Ifeyinwa Juliet & Gupta, Himanshu & Kunc, Martin, 2021. "Risks associated with the implementation of big data analytics in sustainable supply chains," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 105(C).
   7. Igor Kotlán & Daniel Němec & Zuzana Machová, 2019. "Právní nejistota v daňové oblasti a její dopady na nabídku práce v České republice [Legal Uncertainty in Taxation and Its Impacts on Labour Supply in the Czech Republic]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2019(4), pages 371-384.

7. Matthias Lang, 2015. "First-Order and Second-Order Ambiguity Aversion," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2015_13, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
   • Matthias Lang, 2017. "First-Order and Second-Order Ambiguity Aversion," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(4), pages 1254-1269, April.

   Cited by:

   1. Imhof, Lorens & Kräkel, Matthias, 2013. "Bonus Pools and the Informativeness Principle," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 413, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
      • Imhof, Lorens & Kräkel, Matthias, 2014. "Bonus pools and the informativeness principle," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 180-191.
   2. Andrew J. Keith & Darryl K. Ahner, 2021. "A survey of decision making and optimization under uncertainty," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 300(2), pages 319-353, May.
   3. Jingyi Xue, 2020. "Preferences with changing ambiguity aversion," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(1), pages 1-60, February.
   4. Luigi Alberto Franzoni, 2022. "Efficient liability law when parties genuinely disagree," Working Papers wp1176, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
   5. Christoph Bühren & Fabian Meier & Marco Pleßner, 2023. "Ambiguity aversion: bibliometric analysis and literature review of the last 60 years," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 73(2), pages 495-525, June.
   6. Kräkel, Matthias, 2016. "Peer effects and incentives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 120-127.
      • Kräkel, Matthias, 2014. "Peer Effects and Incentives," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 03/2014, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
   7. Kellner, Christian & Le Quement, Mark T., 2018. "Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 1-17.
   8. Thomas Knispel & Roger J. A. Laeven & Gregor Svindland, 2021. "Asymptotic Analysis of Risk Premia Induced by Law-Invariant Risk Measures," Papers 2107.01730, arXiv.org.
   9. Soheil Ghili & Peter Klibanoff, 2021. "If It Is Surely Better, Do It More? Implications for Preferences Under Ambiguity," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(12), pages 7619-7636, December.
   10. Bao, Xing & Diabat, Ali & Zheng, Zhongliang, 2020. "An ambiguous manager's disruption decisions with insufficient data in recovery phase," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
   11. Galanis, Spyros, 2018. "Financial complexity and trade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 219-230.
   12. Christian Kellner, 2017. "The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(2), pages 83-119, June.

8. Matthias Lang, 2014. "Communicating Subjective Evaluations," CESifo Working Paper Series 4830, CESifo.
   • Lang, Matthias, 2019. "Communicating subjective evaluations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 163-199.
   • Matthias Lang, 2012. "Communicating Subjective Evaluations," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012_14, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Apr 2018.
   • Lang, Matthias, 2019. "Communicating subjective evaluations," Munich Reprints in Economics 78243, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
   • Lang, Matthias, 2018. "Communicating Subjective Evaluations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 120, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.

   Cited by:

   1. Matthias Lang, 2021. "Stochastic Contracts and Subjective Evaluations," CESifo Working Paper Series 9458, CESifo.
      • Lang, Matthias, 2022. "Stochastic Contracts and Subjective Evaluations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 329, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
      • Matthias Lang, 2023. "Stochastic contracts and subjective evaluations," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(1), pages 104-134, March.
   2. Bester, Helmut & Münster, Johannes, 2013. "Subjective evaluation versus public information," Discussion Papers 2013/6, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
      • Helmut Bester & Johannes Münster, 2016. "Subjective evaluation versus public information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(4), pages 723-753, April.
      • Bester, Helmut & Münster, Johannes, 2013. "Subjective Evaluation versus Public Information," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 399, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
   3. Matthias Lang, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Narratives," CESifo Working Paper Series 8502, CESifo.
   4. Daniel Rehsmann & Béatrice Roussillon & Paul Schweinzer, 2023. "Contesting Fake News," CESifo Working Paper Series 10632, CESifo.

9. Matthias Lang & Achim Wambach, 2010. "The fog of fraud – mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010_24, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
   • Lang, Matthias & Wambach, Achim, 2013. "The fog of fraud – Mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 255-275.

   Cited by:

   1. Lang, Matthias, 2017. "Legal uncertainty as a welfare enhancing screen," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 274-289.
      • Matthias Lang, 2016. "Legal Uncertainty as a Welfare Enhancing Screen," CESifo Working Paper Series 6164, CESifo.
      • Matthias Lang, 2014. "Legal Uncertainty as a Welfare Enhancing Screen," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_17, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Oct 2016.
   2. Mehdi Ayouni & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 82(3), pages 327-339, March.
      • Mehdi Ayouni & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01503765, HAL.
      • Mehdi Ayouni & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion," Post-Print halshs-01503765, HAL.
   3. Nils Mahlow & Joël Wagner, 2016. "Evolution of Strategic Levers in Insurance Claims Management: An Industry Survey," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 19(2), pages 197-223, September.
   4. Yoshio Kamijo & Takehito Masuda & Hiroshi Uemura, 2015. "Who is audited? Experimental study on rule-based and human tax auditing schemes," Working Papers SDES-2015-9, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Jan 2015.
   5. Riedel, Frank, 2017. "Uncertain acts in games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 571, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
      • Frank Riedel, 2017. "Uncertain Acts in Games," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 275-292, December.
   6. Riedel, Frank & Sass, Linda, 2016. "The strategic use of ambiguity," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 452, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
   7. Berno Buechel & Eberhard Feess & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2018. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Sophisticated and Naive Offenders," CESifo Working Paper Series 7106, CESifo.
      • Buechel, Berno & Feess, Eberhard & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2020. "Optimal law enforcement with sophisticated and naïve offenders," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 836-857.
   8. Pollrich, Martin, 2015. "Mediated Audits," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 809, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
      • Martin Pollrich, 2017. "Mediated audits," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(1), pages 44-68, March.
      • Martin Pollrich, "undated". "Mediated Audits," BDPEMS Working Papers 2015003, Berlin School of Economics.
   9. Alfredo Di Tillio & Nenad Kos & Matthias Messner, 2014. "The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms," CESifo Working Paper Series 4949, CESifo.
      • Alfredo Di Tillio & Nenad Kos & Matthias Messner, 2012. "The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms," Working Papers 446, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
   10. Shyam Sunder, 2011. "Paradox of Writing Clear Rules: Interplay of Financial Reporting Standards and Engineering," The Japanese Accounting Review, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, vol. 1, pages 119-130, December.
   11. Lee Kangoh, 2018. "Optimism, Pessimism, Audit Uncertainty, and Tax Compliance," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-12, January.

Articles

1. Lang, Matthias & Schudy, Simeon, 2023. "(Dis)honesty and the value of transparency for campaign promises," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
   • Matthias Lang & Simeon Schudy, 2020. "(Dis)honesty and the Value of Transparency for Campaign Promises," CESifo Working Paper Series 8366, CESifo.
   • Matthias Lang & Simeon Schudy, 2023. "(Dis)honesty and the Value of Transparency for Campaign Promises," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 409, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
   See citations under working paper version above.
2. Matthias Lang, 2023. "Stochastic contracts and subjective evaluations," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(1), pages 104-134, March.
   • Matthias Lang, 2021. "Stochastic Contracts and Subjective Evaluations," CESifo Working Paper Series 9458, CESifo.
   • Lang, Matthias, 2022. "Stochastic Contracts and Subjective Evaluations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 329, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
   See citations under working paper version above.
3. Helmut Bester & Matthias Lang & Jianpei Li, 2021. "Signaling versus Auditing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(4), pages 859-883, December.
   • Bester, Helmut & Lang, Matthias & Li, Jianpei, 2021. "Signaling versus Auditing," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 286, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
   • Helmut Bester & Matthias Lang & Jianpei Li, 2018. "Signaling versus Auditing," CESifo Working Paper Series 7183, CESifo.
   See citations under working paper version above.
4. Lang, Matthias, 2019. "Communicating subjective evaluations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 163-199.
   • Matthias Lang, 2012. "Communicating Subjective Evaluations," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012_14, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Apr 2018.
   • Matthias Lang, 2014. "Communicating Subjective Evaluations," CESifo Working Paper Series 4830, CESifo.
   • Lang, Matthias, 2019. "Communicating subjective evaluations," Munich Reprints in Economics 78243, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
   • Lang, Matthias, 2018. "Communicating Subjective Evaluations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 120, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
   See citations under working paper version above.
5. Matthias Lang, 2017. "First-Order and Second-Order Ambiguity Aversion," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(4), pages 1254-1269, April.
   • Matthias Lang, 2015. "First-Order and Second-Order Ambiguity Aversion," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2015_13, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
   See citations under working paper version above.
6. Lang, Matthias, 2017. "Legal uncertainty as a welfare enhancing screen," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 274-289.
   • Matthias Lang, 2016. "Legal Uncertainty as a Welfare Enhancing Screen," CESifo Working Paper Series 6164, CESifo.
   • Matthias Lang, 2014. "Legal Uncertainty as a Welfare Enhancing Screen," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_17, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Oct 2016.
   See citations under working paper version above.
7. Lang, Matthias & Seel, Christian & Strack, Philipp, 2014. "Deadlines in stochastic contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 134-142.

   Cited by:

   1. Jean-Michel Benkert & Igor Letina, 2016. "Designing dynamic research contests," ECON - Working Papers 235, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Aug 2019.
      • Jean-Michel Benkert & Igor Letina, 2020. "Designing Dynamic Research Contests," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 270-289, November.
   2. Letina, Igor & Benkert, Jean-Michel, 2016. "Designing Dynamic Research Tournaments," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145738, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
   3. Christian Seel, 2018. "Contests with endogenous deadlines," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 119-133, March.
   4. Kostas Bimpikis & Shayan Ehsani & Mohamed Mostagir, 2019. "Designing Dynamic Contests," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 67(2), pages 339-356, March.
   5. Ewerhart, Christian, 2017. "Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 195-211.
      • Christian Ewerhart, 2015. "Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction," ECON - Working Papers 186, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jun 2017.
   6. Dmitry Ryvkin, 2022. "To Fight or to Give Up? Dynamic Contests with a Deadline," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(11), pages 8144-8165, November.
      • Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "To fight or to give up? Dynamic contests with a deadline," Working Papers wp2020_07_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
   7. Xu Tian & Gongbing Bi, 2022. "Multiplicative output form and its applications to problems in the homogenous innovation contest model," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 44(3), pages 709-732, September.
   8. C. Gizem Korpeoglu & Ersin Körpeoğlu & Sıdıka Tunç, 2021. "Optimal Duration of Innovation Contests," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 23(3), pages 657-675, May.

8. Lang, Matthias & Wambach, Achim, 2013. "The fog of fraud – Mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 255-275.
   • Matthias Lang & Achim Wambach, 2010. "The fog of fraud – mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010_24, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
   See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 10 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.

1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (7) 2012-07-08 2015-01-26 2015-10-10 2018-10-29 2020-09-28 2022-01-31 2022-10-10. Author is listed
2. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (5) 2010-09-11 2012-07-08 2015-10-10 2018-10-29 2022-01-31. Author is listed
3. NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (3) 2018-10-29 2022-01-31 2022-10-10
4. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (2) 2020-08-31 2023-07-31
5. NEP-LMA: Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, and Wages (2) 2018-10-29 2022-01-31
6. NEP-DES: Economic Design (1) 2020-09-28
7. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2010-09-11
8. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (1) 2015-01-26
9. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 2023-07-31
10. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (1) 2015-10-10

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