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The Fulfillment of Parties’ Election Pledges: A Comparative Study on the Impact of Power Sharing

Author

Listed:
  • Robert Thomson
  • Terry Royed
  • Elin Naurin
  • Joaquín Artés
  • Rory Costello
  • Laurenz Ennser‐Jedenastik
  • Mark Ferguson
  • Petia Kostadinova
  • Catherine Moury
  • François Pétry
  • Katrin Praprotnik

Abstract

Why are some parties more likely than others to keep the promises they made during previous election campaigns? This study provides the first large‐scale comparative analysis of pledge fulfillment with common definitions. We study the fulfillment of over 20,000 pledges made in 57 election campaigns in 12 countries, and our findings challenge the common view of parties as promise breakers. Many parties that enter government executives are highly likely to fulfill their pledges, and significantly more so than parties that do not enter government executives. We explain variation in the fulfillment of governing parties’ pledges by the extent to which parties share power in government. Parties in single‐party executives, both with and without legislative majorities, have the highest fulfillment rates. Within coalition governments, the likelihood of pledge fulfillment is highest when the party receives the chief executive post and when another governing party made a similar pledge.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Thomson & Terry Royed & Elin Naurin & Joaquín Artés & Rory Costello & Laurenz Ennser‐Jedenastik & Mark Ferguson & Petia Kostadinova & Catherine Moury & François Pétry & Katrin Praprotnik, 2017. "The Fulfillment of Parties’ Election Pledges: A Comparative Study on the Impact of Power Sharing," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(3), pages 527-542, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:61:y:2017:i:3:p:527-542
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12313
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Clemens Fuest & Klaus Gründler & Niklas Potrafke & Fabian Ruthardt, 2021. "Read My Lips? Taxes and Elections," CESifo Working Paper Series 9401, CESifo.
    2. Niklas Potrafke, 2019. "Fiscal Performance of Minority Governments: New Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series 7733, CESifo.
    3. Lang, Matthias & Schudy, Simeon, 2023. "(Dis)honesty and the value of transparency for campaign promises," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
    4. Matthieß, Theres, 2020. "Retrospective pledge voting: A comparative study of the electoral consequences of government parties’ pledge fulfilment," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 59(4), pages 774-796.
    5. Prasenjit Banerjee & Vegard Iversen & Sandip Mitra & Antonio Nicolò & Kunal Sen, 2018. "Politicians and Their Promises in an Uncertain World: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in India," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1806, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    6. Alejandro Ecker & Thomas M. Meyer, 2019. "Fairness and qualitative portfolio allocation in multiparty governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 309-330, December.
    7. Marco Schito, 2021. "A Sectoral Approach to the Politics of State Aid in the European Union: an Analysis of the European Automotive Industry," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 1-31, March.
    8. Petia Kostadinova & Magda Giurcanu, 2018. "Capturing the legislative priorities of transnational Europarties and the European Commission: A pledge approach," European Union Politics, , vol. 19(2), pages 363-379, June.

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