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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-3WRBN38-7/2/c33e9f7316ef3094f157854a8fcafa1f
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 43 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4-6 (April)
Pages: 779-789

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:43:y:1999:i:4-6:p:779-789

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1. Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Working papers 95-8, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   
   • Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
   • Aghion, P. & Tirole, J., 1997. "Formal and real authority in organizations," Open Access publications from University College London http://discovery.ucl.ac.u, University College London.
   • Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Scholarly Articles 4554125, Harvard University Department of Economics.
   • Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Normal and Real Authority in Organizations," Working papers 94-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," IDEI Working Papers 37, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
2. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
   
   • Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1994. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Discussion Papers 1117, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
   • Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1560, David K. Levine.
3. Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1995. "The Swing Voter's Curse," Discussion Papers 1064, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
   
   • Feddersen, Timothy J & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "The Swing Voter's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 408-24, June.
4. Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 796-805, September.

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Cited by:

1. Haan, Marco, 2000. "Endogenous party formation in a model of representative democracy," CCSO Working Papers 200010, University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research.
   
   • Marco Haan, 2000. "Endogenous Party Formation in a Model of Representative Democracy," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0598, Econometric Society.
2. Klaas J. Beniers & Robert Dur, 2004. "Politicians’ Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 1228, CESifo Group Munich.
   
   • Klaas Beniers & Robert Dur, 2007. "Politicians’ motivation, political culture, and electoral competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 29-54, February.
3. Massimo Morelli, 2001. "Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems," Economics Working Papers 0018, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
   
   • Massimo Morelli, 2004. "Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71, pages 829-853, 07.
   • Morelli, Massimo, 1998. "Party Formation and Policy Outcomes Under Different Electoral Systems," Staff General Research Papers 1242, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
4. Cecilia Testa, 2004. "Party Polarization and Electoral Accountability," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 130, Econometric Society.
5. Kunal Sengupta & Amal Sanyal, 2004. "Delegation in a Cheap-Talk Game: A Voting Example," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 471, Econometric Society.
6. Eguia, Jon X., 2011. "Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 111-135, September.
7. Albrecht Morgenstern, 2004. "Curbing Power or Progress? Governing with an Opposition Veto," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse10_2004, University of Bonn, Germany.
8. Claudio Parés, 2010. "Political Careers Concerns and Political Parties," Working Papers 02-2010, Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Concepción.
9. Castanheira, Micael & Crutzen, Benoît SY & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2005. "Party Governance and Political Competition with an Application to the American Direct Primacy," CEPR Discussion Papers 4890, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
10. Amal Sanyal & Kunal Sengupta, 2005. "Reputation, Cheap Talk and Delegation," Game Theory and Information 0501001, EconWPA.
11. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2006. "A Model of Forum Shopping," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1091-1113, September.
12. Micael Castanheira De Moura & Juan Carrillo, 2008. "Information and strategic political polarization," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/10003, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    
    • JuanD. Carrillo & Micael Castanheira, 2008. "Information and Strategic Political Polarisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(530), pages 845-874, 07.
13. Carrillo, Juan D & Castanheira, Micael, 2002. "Platform Divergence, Political Efficiency and the Median Voter Theorem," CEPR Discussion Papers 3180, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
14. Klaas J. Beniers, 2005. "Party Governance and the Selection of Parliamentarians," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-080/1, Tinbergen Institute.
15. Klaas J. Beniers, 2005. "Party Governance and the Selection of Parliamentarians," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-080/1, Tinbergen Institute.
16. Jon Eguia, 2012. "A spatial theory of party formation," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 549-570, April.
17. Klaas J. Beniers & Robert Dur, 2004. "Politicians' Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-065/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 16 Aug 2005.
18. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2004. "A Model of Forum Shopping, with Special Reference to Standard Setting Organizations," NBER Working Papers 10664, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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