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Party Formation and Policy Outcomes Under Different Electoral Systems

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  • Morelli, Massimo

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 1242.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 1998
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Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:1242

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Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
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Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
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  1. Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February.
  2. Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department.
  3. Alesina, Alberto & Spear, Stephen E., 1988. "An overlapping generations model of electoral competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 359-379, December.
  4. Myerson, Roger B., 1999. "Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 671-697, April.
  5. Nicola Persico & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 225-239, March.
  6. David P. Myatt, 2000. "The New Theory of Strategic Voting," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society 1586, Econometric Society.
  7. Wittman, Donald, 1977. "Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 180-189, February.
  8. DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & IANNANTUONI, Giovanna, 2000. "A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2000037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. E. Maskin, 1979. "Voting Schemes for Public Alternatives: Some Notes on Majority Rule," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 229, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  10. Caillaud, B. & Tirole, J., 1999. "Party governance and ideological bias," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 779-789, April.
  11. Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 796-805, September.
  12. Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1992. "The role of party reputation in the formation of policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 107-121, October.
  13. Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-41, November.
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