Party Organization and Electoral Competition
AbstractWe propose a model in which two parties select the internal organization that helps them win the election. Party choices provide incentives to the politicians who represent them. Depending on whether politicians are opportunistic or partisan, we identify four effects. First, a selection effect: intraparty competition gives parties more candidates to choose from. Second, an incentive effect: intraparty competition adds a hurdle and impacts on candidates' incentives. Third, a trust effect: because of the incentive effect, intraparty competition is a signal to uninformed voters. Finally, with partisan preferences, an ideology effect appears. Ideology is a public good in a competitive party and induces free riding. Intraparty competition is valuable when voters are badly informed or intraparty competition is weak. These results rationalize the introduction of direct primaries in the United States, the organizational changes in Western European parties since 1960, and the organizational differences between centrist and extreme parties. (JEL D23, D72, D81) The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: firstname.lastname@example.org, Oxford University Press.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization.
Volume (Year): 26 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://jleo.oupjournals.org/
Other versions of this item:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Castanheira, Micael & Nicodème, Gaëtan & Profeta, Paola, 2011.
"On the political economics of tax reforms,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
8507, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Micael Castanheira & Gaëtan Nicodème & Paola Profeta, 2012. "On the political economics of tax reforms: survey and empirical assessment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 598-624, August.
- Micael Castanheira De Moura & BENOIT S. Y. Crutzen & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2008.
"The impact of party organization on electoral outcomes,"
Working Papers ECARES
2008_016, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Micael Castanheira & Benoît Crutzen & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2010. "The Impact of Party Organization on Electoral Outcomes," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(4), pages 677-695.
- B.S.Y. Crutzen & Micael Castanheira De Moura & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2010. "The impact of party organization on electoral outcomes," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/136806, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Evrenk, Haldun & Lambie-Hanson, Timothy & Xu, Yourong, 2013. "Party-bosses vs. party-primaries: Quality of legislature under different selectorates," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 168-182.
- Fernando Aragon, 2012. "Party Nomination Procedures and Quality of Government," Working Papers dp12-10, CRABE, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
- Motz, Nicolas, 2012.
"Who emerges from smoke-filled rooms? Political parties and candidate selection,"
42678, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Motz, Nicolas, 2012. "Who emerges from smoke-filled rooms? Political parties and candidate selection," MPRA Paper 44462, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Feb 2013.
- Rafael Hortala-Vallve & Hannes Mueller, 2010.
"Primaries: The Unifying Force,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
843.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Fernando Aragon, 2009. "Candidate nomination procedures andpolitical selection: evidence from LatinAmerican parties," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 003, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Fernando Aragón, 2014. "Why do parties use primaries?: Political selection versus candidate incentives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(1), pages 205-225, July.
- Agustín Casas, 2013. "Partisan politics : parties, primaries and elections," Economics Working Papers we1315, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.