The impact of party organization on electoral outcomes
AbstractWe present a model of electoral competition in which parties act as brands and use competition to select their candidates. We show that the forces that shape the competition between party representatives and independents rationalize the positive correlation between inequality and polarization documented by McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006) for the US. We also show that, when voters are badly informed about the quality of candidates, it is optimal for party to use primaries to get an edge on independent candidates. This rationalizes the introduction of the American direct primary in the US at the beginning of the twentieth century.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series Working Papers ECARES with number 2008_016.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by:
parties as a brand; direct primary; intra-party discipline; polarization; political regime; Duverger;
Other versions of this item:
- Micael Castanheira & Benoît Crutzen & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2010. "The Impact of Party Organization on Electoral Outcomes," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(4), pages 677-695.
- B.S.Y. Crutzen & Micael Castanheira De Moura & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2010. "The impact of party organization on electoral outcomes," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/136806, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-10-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-10-21 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2008-10-21 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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