A rationale for intra-party democracy
AbstractThis paper provides a rationale for intra-party democracy within a political agency model with moral hazard. The focus is on the party's internal procedures for policy determination. I show that democratizing those procedures benefits the party leadership, which seeks to maximize joint reelection chances of the party's incumbents. The reason is that under intra-party democracy, the voters adopt less demanding reappointment rules and reelect the party's incumbents more often than under leaders-dominated party structure. My results therefore indicate that democratizing policy determination processes within the party is in the interests of both the leadership and the ordinary members. The voters in turn are equally well off regardless of the party's internal procedure for policy determination.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 39091.
Date of creation: 21 May 2012
Date of revision:
Intra-party democracy; Leaders-dominated party; Policy determination; Party internal structure; Political agency; Moral hazard;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-06-05 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2012-06-05 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-POL-2012-06-05 (Positive Political Economics)
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