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Campaigning internally or externally

Author

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  • Shyh-Fang Ueng

    (National Chung-Cheng University)

Abstract

This paper uses a forward-looking two-period coalitional game to analyze party prominent figures’ internal competition for personal power in the party and external cooperation on national elections for the party. Incorporating the electorate’s preference for new alternatives over the establishment, it characterizes the equilibrium of prominent figures’ (1) maneuver for personal power in the party; (2) grouping to form factions in the party or split-off new parties; (3) campaign effort in the national election for the party; and (4) the resulting outcomes of the national election. It shows that the electorate’s longing for new alternatives induces prominent figures to maneuver more in the party; form a new party instead of a faction; and campaign harder for the national election. This study synthesizes the analysis of internal party politics and inter-party competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Shyh-Fang Ueng, 2021. "Campaigning internally or externally," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 301(1), pages 245-267, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:301:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-020-03815-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s10479-020-03815-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Internal maneuver; Personal power; Factions; Split-off parties; Campaign effort; The national election;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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