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Estimating Noncooperative and Cooperative Models of Bargaining: An Empirical Comparison

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  • Masanori Mitsutsune

    ()
    (Tokyo Metropolitan Government)

  • Takanori Adachi

    ()
    (School of Economics, Nagoya University)

Abstract

This paper examines the issue of model selection in studies of strategic situations. In particular, we compare estimation results from Adachi and Watanabe's (2008) noncooperative formulation of government formulation with those from two alternative cooperative formulations. Although the estimates of the ministerial ranking are similar, statistical testing suggests that Adachi and Watanabe's(2008) noncooperative formulation is best fitted to the observed data among the alternative models. This result implies that modeling the time structure in bargaining situations is crucially important at the risk of possibly misspecifying the details of the game.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research in its series KIER Working Papers with number 799.

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Date of creation: Dec 2011
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Handle: RePEc:kyo:wpaper:799

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Keywords: Model selection; Bargaining; Government formation; Structural estimation;

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  1. Britz, Volker & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2008. "Non-cooperative Support for the Asymmetric Nash Bargaining solution," Research Memorandum 018, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  2. Yasutora Watanabe & Takanori Adachi, 2004. "Ministerial Weights and Government Formation: Estimation Using a Bargaining Model," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 742, Econometric Society.
  3. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996. "Bargaining and Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 357-80, March.
  4. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
  5. Ray, Debraj, 2007. "A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199207954, October.
  6. Xingwei Hu, 2006. "An Asymmetric Shapley–Shubik Power Index," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 229-240, August.
  7. McDonald, James B, 1984. "Some Generalized Functions for the Size Distribution of Income," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(3), pages 647-63, May.
  8. Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano, Federico, 2008. "Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 341-353, May.
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