Estimating Noncooperative and Cooperative Models of Bargaining: An Empirical Comparison
AbstractThis paper examines the issue of model selection in studies of strategic situations. In particular, we compare estimation results from Adachi and Watanabe's (2008) noncooperative formulation of government formulation with those from two alternative cooperative formulations. Although the estimates of the ministerial ranking are similar, statistical testing suggests that Adachi and Watanabe's(2008) noncooperative formulation is best fitted to the observed data among the alternative models. This result implies that modeling the time structure in bargaining situations is crucially important at the risk of possibly misspecifying the details of the game.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research in its series KIER Working Papers with number 799.
Date of creation: Dec 2011
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Model selection; Bargaining; Government formation; Structural estimation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C52 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- H19 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Other
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-12-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-ECM-2011-12-13 (Econometrics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-12-13 (Game Theory)
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