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The Logic of Belief Persistence

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  • Battigalli, Pierpaolo
  • Bonanno, Giacomo

Abstract

The interaction bietween knowledge and belief in a temporal context is analyzed. An axiomatic formulation and semantic characterization of the principle of belief persistency implied by the standard conditionalization rule are provided. This principle says that an individual does not change her mind unless new evidence forces her to do so. It is shown that if beliefs are conscious (or stateindependent) and satisfy negative introspection then the principle of persistency of beliefs is characterized by the following axiom schema: the individual believes that 9 at date t if and orilly if she believes at date t that she will believe that 4 at date t+l.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal Economics and Philosophy.

Volume (Year): 13 (1997)
Issue (Month): 01 (April)
Pages: 39-59

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Handle: RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:13:y:1997:i:01:p:39-59_00

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Cited by:
  1. Samet, Dov, 1999. "Bayesianism without learning," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 227-242, June.
  2. Hvide, H.K., 1999. "Bounds to Memory Loss," Papers 11-99, Tel Aviv.
  3. Giacomo Bonanno, 2003. "The Logic Of Prediction," Working Papers 9812, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  4. Pierpaolo Battigali & Giacomo Bonanno, . "Recent Results On Belief, Knowledge And The Epistemic Foundations Of Game Theory," Department of Economics 98-14, California Davis - Department of Economics.
  5. Giacomo Bonanno, 2003. "Intersubjective Consistency Of Knowledge And Belief," Working Papers 983, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  6. Matthew Ryan, 2001. "Capacity Updating Rules and Rational Belief Change," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 73-87, August.
  7. Giacomo Bonanno, 2005. "A simple modal logic for belief revision," Working Papers 517, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.

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