Advanced Search

Papers Articles Authors Institutions Data (FRED®)

Abstract

We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to commit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set of actions rather than to a single action, players can implement a wide range of action profiles. We give a complete characterization of implementable profiles and provide a simple method to find them. Profiles implementable by bilateral commitments are shown to be generically inefficient. Surprisingly, allowing for gradualism (i.e., step by step commitment) does not change the set of implementable profiles.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.economics.adelaide.edu.au/research/papers/doc/wp2006-07.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Adelaide, School of Economics in its series School of Economics Working Papers with number 2006-07.

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:adl:wpaper:2006-07

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Adelaide SA 5005
Phone: (618) 8303 5540
Web page: http://www.economics.adelaide.edu.au/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: commitment; self-enforcing; treaties; inefficiency; agreements; Pareto-improvement;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
• C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
• H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2006-05-13 (All new papers)
• NEP-BEC-2006-05-13 (Business Economics)
• NEP-GTH-2006-05-13 (Game Theory)
• NEP-PBE-2006-05-13 (Public Economics)

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

1. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2032, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
   
   • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," NBER Working Papers 10397, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," ESE Discussion Papers 109, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
   • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "AGREEING NOW TO AGREE LATER: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2004/472, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
2. Eric van Damme & Sjaak Hurkens, 1996. "Endogenous Stackelberg leadership," Economics Working Papers 190, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
   
   • van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1999. "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 105-129, July.
   • Damme, E.E.C. van & Hurkens, J.P.M., 1996. "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Discussion Paper 1996-115, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
   • Damme, E.E.C. van & Hurkens, J.P.M., 1999. "Endogenous Stackelberg leadership," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154410, Tilburg University.
   • Damme, E.E.C. van & Hurkens, S., 1998. "Endogenous Stackelberg leadership," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-80496, Tilburg University.
3. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401.
   
   • Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
4. Bade, Sophie & Haeringer, Guillaume & Renou, Ludovic, 2007. "More strategies, more Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 551-557, July.
   
   • Sophie Bade & Guillaume Haeringer & Ludovic Renou, 2005. "More strategies, more Nash equilibria," Game Theory and Information 0502001, EconWPA.
   • Sophie Bade & Guillaume Haeringer & Ludovic Renou, 2005. "More Strategies, More Nash Equilibria," School of Economics Working Papers 2005-01, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
5. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1998. "Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 902-32, September.
   
   • B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1997. "Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1787, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
6. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984. "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry," NBER Working Papers 1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   
   • Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
7. Renou, Ludovic, 2009. "Commitment games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 488-505, May.
8. Ben Lockwood & Jonathan Thomas, 1999. "Gradualism and Irreversibility," Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics 9909, Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews.
   
   • Lockwood, Ben & Thomas, Jonathan P, 2002. "Gradualism and Irreversibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(2), pages 339-56, April.
   • Lockwood, B. & Thomas, J.P., 1999. "Gradualism and Irreversibility," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 550, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
   • Ben Lockwood & Jonathan P. Thomas, 1999. "Gradualism and Irreversibility," CSGR Working papers series 28/99, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick.
   • Lockwood, B. & Thomas, J.P., 1999. "Gradualism and Irreversibility," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 525, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
9. Varian, Hal R., 1994. "Sequential contributions to public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 165-186, February.
10. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1996. "A Bargaining Model Based on the Commitment Tactic," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 134-152, April.
    
    • Abhinay Muthoo, . "A Bargaining Model Based on the Commitment Tactic," Economics Discussion Papers 420, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
11. Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-80, January.
    
    • Milgrom, P. & Shannon, C., 1991. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Papers 11, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
12. Harris, Christopher & Reny, Philip & Robson, Arthur, 1995. "The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 507-44, May.
13. repec:bla:restud:v:72:y:2005:i:2:p:543-566 is not listed on IDEAS
14. repec:bla:restud:v:75:y:2008:i:1:p:99-116 is not listed on IDEAS
15. Admati, Anat R & Perry, Motty, 1991. "Joint Projects without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 259-76, April.
16. Yildirim, Huseyin, 2005. "Contests with multiple rounds," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 213-227, April.

Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

Cited by:

1. Conley, John P. & Neilson, William, 2009. "Endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 761-774, July.
2. Frédéric Koessler & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2010. "Committing to transparency to resist corruption," Working Papers halshs-00564890, HAL.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:adl:wpaper:2006-07

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dmitriy Kvasov).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

---

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.

Privacy Legal