Factions and Political Competition
AbstractThis paper presents a new model of political competition where candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party to the allocation of resources. Several key theoretical predictions of the model find a counterpart in our empirical analysis of newly coded data on the provision of water services in Mexico.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 13008.
Date of creation: Apr 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Persico, Nicola, José C. R. Pueblita and Dan Silverman. “Factions and Political Competition." Journal of Political Economy 119, 2 (April 2011): 242-288.
Note: PE POL
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Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
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Other versions of this item:
- Nicola Persico & Jos� C. R. Pueblita & Dan Silverman, 2011. "Factions and Political Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(2), pages 242 - 288.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-04-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-04-09 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PBE-2007-04-09 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2007-04-09 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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