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Does delegation of fiscal policy to an independent agency make a difference? Evidence from intergovernmental transfers in India

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Khemani, Stuti

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Development Economics.

Volume (Year): 82 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 464-484
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Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:82:y:2007:i:2:p:464-484

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  1. Shawn A. Cole, 2008. "Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-001, Harvard Business School. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ahmad, Junaid & Devarajan, Shantayanan & Khemani, Stuti & Shah, Shekhar, 2005. "Decentralization and service delivery," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3603, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  3. Singh, Nirvikar, 2007. "Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization in India," MPRA Paper 1447, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  4. Singh, Nirvikar, 2008. "Holding India together: The role of institutions of federalism," MPRA Paper 12432, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Arulampalam, Wiji & Dasgupta, Sugato & Dhillon, Amrita & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2008. "Electoral Goals and Center-State Transfers: A Theoretical Model and Empirical Evidence from India," IZA Discussion Papers 3376, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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