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Does delegation of fiscal policy to an independent agency make a difference? Evidence from intergovernmental transfers in India

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  • Khemani, Stuti

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Development Economics.

Volume (Year): 82 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 464-484

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Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:82:y:2007:i:2:p:464-484

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References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. Khemani, Stuti, 2003. "Partisan politics and intergovernmental transfers in India," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3016, The World Bank.
  2. Grossman, Philip J, 1994. " A Political Theory of Intergovernmental Grants," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(3-4), pages 295-303, March.
  3. Case, A., 1997. "Election Goals and Income Redistribution: Recent Evidence from Albania," Papers 177, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Development Studies.
  4. Barry Eichengreen & Ricardo Hausmann & Jürgen Von Hagen, 1999. "Reforming Budgetary Institutions in Latin America: The Case for a National Fiscal Council," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 415-442, October.
  5. Johansson, Eva, 2003. "Intergovernmental grants as a tactical instrument: empirical evidence from Swedish municipalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 883-915, May.
  6. von Hagen, Jurgen, 1991. "A note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 199-210, March.
  7. Strömberg, David, 2002. "Optimal Campaigning in Presidential Elections: The Probability of Being Florida," CEPR Discussion Papers 3372, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. James M. Poterba, 1993. "State Responses to Fiscal Crisis: The Effects of Budgetary Institutionsand Politics," NBER Working Papers 4375, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Assar Lindbeck & Jörgen Weibull, 1987. "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 273-297, January.
  10. Andrew Worthington & Brian Dollery, 1998. "The political determination of intergovernmental grants in Australia," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 299-315, March.
  11. Shawn A. Cole, 2008. "Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-001, Harvard Business School.
  12. Alberto Porto & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2001. "Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants: Evidence From Argentina," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 237-256, November.
  13. Snyder, James M, 1989. "Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 637-60, May.
  14. Dixit, Avinash & Londregan, John, 1998. "Fiscal federalism and redistributive politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 153-180, May.
  15. Khemani, Stuti, 2004. "Political cycles in a developing economy: effect of elections in the Indian States," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 125-154, February.
  16. Strömberg, David, 2002. "Optimal Campaigning in Presidential Elections: The Probability of Being Florida," Seminar Papers 706, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  17. Inman, Robert P. & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1996. "Designing tax policy in federalist economies: An overview," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 307-334, June.
  18. Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-64, August.
  19. Wright, Gavin, 1974. "The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: An Econometric Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 56(1), pages 30-38, February.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Singh, Nirvikar, 2007. "Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization in India," MPRA Paper 1447, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Peter Grajzl, 2011. "A property rights approach to legislative delegation," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 177-200, June.
  3. Emilie CALDEIRA, 2011. "Does the system of allocation of intergovernmental transfers in Senegal eliminate politically motivated targeting?," Working Papers 201105, CERDI.
  4. Wiji Arulampalam & Sugato Dasgupta & Amrita Dhillon & Bhaskar Dutta, 2008. "Electoral goals and center-state transfers: A Theoretical model and empirical evidence from India," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 08-14, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
  5. Bharatee Dash & Angara Raja, 2013. "Do political determinants affect the size and composition of public expenditure? A study of the Indian states," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 60(3), pages 293-317, September.
  6. Stephan Litschig, 2010. "Are Rules-based Government Programs Shielded from Special-Interest Politics? Evidence from Revenue-Sharing Transfers in Brazil," Working Papers 483, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  7. Banful, Afua Branoah, 2011. "Old Problems in the New Solutions? Politically Motivated Allocation of Program Benefits and the "New" Fertilizer Subsidies," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 1166-1176, July.
  8. Shawn Cole, 2009. "Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 219-50, January.
  9. Dash, Bharatee Bhusana & Raja, Angara V., 2012. "Political Determinants of the Allocation of Public Expenditures: A Study of the Indian States," Working Papers 12/101, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
  10. Joanis, Marcelin, 2014. "Shared accountability and partial decentralization in local public good provision," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 28-37.
  11. Ahmad, Junaid & Devarajan, Shantayanan & Khemani, Stuti & Shah, Shekhar, 2005. "Decentralization and service delivery," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3603, The World Bank.
  12. Hickey, Ross, 2010. "Intergovernmental Transfers and Re-Election Concerned Politicians," MPRA Paper 27204, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Banful, Afua Branoah, 2011. "Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting? Evidence from Ghana," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 380-390, November.
  14. Singh, Nirvikar, 2008. "Holding India together: The role of institutions of federalism," MPRA Paper 12432, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Litschig, Stephan, 2012. "Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(11), pages 1047-1060.

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