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Pork Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953–1994

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Author Info
Picci, Lucio
Golden, Miriam

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the political determinants of the distribution of infrastructure expenditures by the Italian government to the country’s 92 provinces between 1953 and 1994. Extending implications of theories of legislative behavior to the context of open-list proportional representation, we examine whether individually powerful legislators and ruling parties direct spending to core or marginal electoral districts, and whether opposition parties share resources via a norm of universalism. We show that when districts elect politically more powerful deputies from the governing parties, they receive more investments. We interpret this as indicating that legislators with political resources reward their core voters by investing in public works in their districts. The governing parties, by contrast, are not able to discipline their own members of parliament sufficiently to target the parties’ areas of core electoral strength. Finally, we find no evidence that a norm of universalism operates to steer resources to areas when the main opposition party gains more votes.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 5626.

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Date of creation: Nov 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:5626

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Keywords: pork barrel distributive politics electoral systems Italy public spending infrastructure

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H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General

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  14. Ronald Kneebone & Kenneth McKenzie, 2001. "Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Fiscal Policy: An Examination of Canadian Provinces," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 8(5), pages 753-774, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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