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Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Fiscal Policy: An Examination of Canadian Provinces

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Author Info
Ronald Kneebone ()
Kenneth McKenzie ()

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Abstract

This paper examines the fiscal policy choices of Canadian provincial governments in the context of partisan and opportunistic cycles. We identify an electoral cycle in which the predilection of provincial governments of all political stripes to increase taxes is temporarily halted in election years. Opportunistic responses in spending are also present. Spending in highly visible areas (schools, roads and hockey rinks) tends to increase in election years. Partisan responses are largely absent from revenues but appear more frequently in program spending choices. Thus, Canadian political parties tend to favour differentiating amongst themselves via their spending, as opposed to their revenue, choices. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1012895211073
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.

Volume (Year): 8 (2001)
Issue (Month): 5 (November)
Pages: 753-774
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:8:y:2001:i:5:p:753-774

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102915

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Related research
Keywords: political economy; partisan and opportunistic effects;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Von Hagen, J., 1992. "Budgeting Procedures and Fiscal Performance in the European Communities," European Economy - Economic Papers 96, Commission of the EC, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN).
  2. Alesina, Alberto F & Cohen, Gerald D & Roubini, Nouriel, 1992. "Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies," CEPR Discussion Papers 608, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Kenneth Rogoff, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," NBER Working Papers 2428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Nordhaus, William D, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(2), pages 169-90, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Breusch, T S & Pagan, A R, 1980. "The Lagrange Multiplier Test and Its Applications to Model Specification in Econometrics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(1), pages 239-53, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Roubini, Nouriel & Sachs, Jeffrey D., 1989. "Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 903-933, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Bonomo, Marco Antônio Cesar & Terra, Maria Cristina T., 2005. "Special Interests and Political Business Cycles," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 597, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  2. J Stephen Ferris & Soo-Bin ParkFF & Stanley L. Winer, 2006. "Political Competition and Convergence to Fundamentals: With Application to the Political Business Cycle and the Size of Government," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  3. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & George Economides & Pantelis Kammas, 2009. "Do political incentives matter for tax policies? Ideology, opportunism and the tax structure," Working Papers 2009_12, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow. [Downloadable!]
  4. Marco Bonomo & Cristina Terra, 2008. "Political Business Cycles through Lobbying," THEMA Working Papers 2008-18, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ferris, J.S. & Park, S. & Winer, S.L., 2007. "Studying the Role of Political Competition in the Evolution of Government Size Over Long Horizons," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0774, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Allan Drazen & Marcela Eslava, 2006. "Pork Barrel Cycles," NBER Working Papers 12190, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Allan Drazen & Marcela Eslava, 2005. "Electoral Manipulation via Expenditure Composition: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 11085, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Dahlberg, Matz & Mörk, Eva, 2008. "Is there an election cycle in public employment? Separating time effects from election year effects," Working Paper Series 2008:3, IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Marcela Eslava, 2006. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy: Survey," RES Working Papers 4487, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  10. Picci, Lucio & Golden, Miriam, 2007. "Pork Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953–1994," MPRA Paper 5626, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Stephen Ferris & Marcel Voia, 2008. "What determines the length of a typical Canadian parliamentary government?," Carleton Economic Papers 08-06, Carleton University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. J. Stephen Ferris & Soo-Bin Park & Stanley L. Winer, 2005. "Political Competition and Convergence to Fundamentals: With Application to the Politcal Business Cycle and the Size of the Public Sector," Carleton Economic Papers 05-09, Carleton University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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