Does the system of allocation of intergovernmental transfers in Senegal eliminate politically motivated targeting?
AbstractWhile there is a large body of literature on the determinants of allocation of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in developed countries, this kind of study is still very limited for developing countries, especially Subsaharan countries. Using an original micro-level public fi nance panel data from Senegal, we address three issues: (1) Does the Senegalese allocation system of fiscal transfers conform to the guidance of the normative theory, in particular, to the equity principle? (2) Does this allocation system eliminate the politically motivated targeting of transfers? (3) If not, what kind of political factors explain the horizontal allocation of resources? By estimating a panel data for 67 local gov- ernments ("communes"), from 1997 to 2009, we fi nd that equity concerns do not affect the allocation of intergovernmental transfers in Senegal, leading to the conclusion that the resources distribution system does not comply with the dictates of normative theory. Moreover, we find evidence that political considerations influence the horizontal allocation of fiscal transfers. In particular, our analysis suggests that transfers allocation follows a pattern of tactical redistribution more than patronage, swing communes being targeted while partisan communes are not.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00576508.
Date of creation: 18 Jul 2011
Date of revision:
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00576508/en/
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
decentralization; political economy; Intergovernmental transfers; senegal;
Other versions of this item:
- Emilie Caldeira, 2012. "Does the System of Allocation of Intergovernmental Transfers in Senegal Eliminate Politically Motivated Targeting?," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 21(2), pages 167-191, March.
- Emilie CALDEIRA, 2011. "Does the system of allocation of intergovernmental transfers in Senegal eliminate politically motivated targeting?," Working Papers 201105, CERDI.
- O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-03-26 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Johansson, Eva, 2003. "Intergovernmental grants as a tactical instrument: empirical evidence from Swedish municipalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 883-915, May.
- R Blundell & Steven Bond, .
"Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data model,"
W14&104., Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Blundell, Richard & Bond, Stephen, 1998. "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 115-143, August.
- Richard Blundell & Steve Bond, 1995. "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models," IFS Working Papers W95/17, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Blundell, R. & Bond, S., 1995. "Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models," Economics Papers 104, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Wiji Arulampalam & Sugato Dasgupta & Amrita Dhillon & Bhaskar Dutta, 2008.
"Electoral goals and center-state transfers: A Theoretical model and empirical evidence from India,"
Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers
08-14, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
- Arulampalam, Wiji & Dasgupta, Sugato & Dhillon, Amrita & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2009. "Electoral goals and center-state transfers: A theoretical model and empirical evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 103-119, January.
- Arulampalam, Wiji & Dasgupta, Sugato & Dhillon, Amrita & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2008. "Electoral Goals and Center-State Transfers: A Theoretical Model and Empirical Evidence from India," IZA Discussion Papers 3376, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Worthington, Andrew C & Dollery, Brian E, 1998.
" The Political Determination of Intergovernmental Grants in Australia,"
Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 299-315, March.
- Andrew Worthington & Brian Dollery, 1998. "The political determination of intergovernmental grants in Australia," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 299-315, March.
- Dennis Patrick Leyden, 1992. "Donor-Determined Intergovernmental Grants Structure," Public Finance Review, , vol. 20(3), pages 321-337, July.
- Shawn A. Cole, 2008.
"Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India,"
Harvard Business School Working Papers
09-001, Harvard Business School.
- Shawn Cole, 2009. "Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 219-50, January.
- Banful, Afua Branoah, 2011. "Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting? Evidence from Ghana," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 380-390, November.
- Linda Veiga & Maria Pinho, 2007. "The political economy of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from a maturing democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 457-477, December.
- Deon Filmer & Lant Pritchett, 2001. "Estimating Wealth Effects Without Expenditure Data—Or Tears: An Application To Educational Enrollments In States Of India," Demography, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 115-132, February.
- repec:fth:inadeb:345 is not listed on IDEAS
- Pereira, Paulo T C, 1996. " A Politico-economic Approach to Intergovernmental Lump-Sum Grants," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 88(1-2), pages 185-201, July.
- Dahlberg, Matz & Johansson, Eva, 1999.
"On the Vote Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments,"
Working Paper Series
1999:24, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Dahlberg, M. & Johansson, E., 1999. "On the Vote Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments," Papers 1999:24, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
- Pranab Bardhan, 2002. "Decentralization of Governance and Development," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 185-205, Fall.
- Anne Case, 1997.
"Election Goals and Income Redistribution: Recent Evidence From Albania,"
227, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Research Program in Development Studies..
- Case, Anne, 2001. "Election goals and income redistribution: Recent evidence from Albania," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 405-423, March.
- Case, A., 1997. "Election Goals and Income Redistribution: Recent Evidence from Albania," Papers 177, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Development Studies.
- Case, A, 1996. "Election Goals and Income Redistribution : Recent Evidence from Albania," Papers 177, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Jameson Boex & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2005. "The Determinants of the Incidence of Intergovernmental Grants: A Survey of the International Experience," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0509, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
- Nickell, Stephen J, 1981. "Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1417-26, November.
- David E. Sahn & David Stifel, 2003. "Exploring Alternative Measures of Welfare in the Absence of Expenditure Data," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 49(4), pages 463-489, December.
- Steven A. Meyer & Shigeto Naka, 1999. "The Determinants Of Japanese Local-Benefit Seeking," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 17(1), pages 87-96, 01.
- Albouy, David, 2012.
"Evaluating the efficiency and equity of federal fiscal equalization,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 96(9-10), pages 824-839.
- David Albouy, 2010. "Evaluating the Efficiency and Equity of Federal Fiscal Equalization," NBER Working Papers 16144, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- David Roodman, 2007.
"A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments,"
125, Center for Global Development.
- Alberto Porto & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2001. "Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants: Evidence From Argentina," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 237-256, November.
- Wright, Gavin, 1974. "The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: An Econometric Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 56(1), pages 30-38, February.
- Jameson Boex, 2003. "The incidence of local government allocations in Tanzania," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0311, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
- Tranchant, Jean-Pierre, 2010. "Does Fiscal Decentralization Dampen All Ethnic Conflicts? The heterogeneous Impact of Fiscal Decentralization on Local Minorities and Local Majorities," MPRA Paper 22776, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Anderson, Gary M & Tollison, Robert D, 1991. "Congressional Influence and Patterns of New Deal Spending, 1933-1939," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 161-75, April.
- Mel Bungey & Peter Kenyon & Philip J. Grossman, 1991. "Explaining intergovernmental grants: Australian evidence," Development Research Unit Working Paper Series archive-14, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- Bird, Richard M. & Smart, Michael, 2002. "Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: International Lessons for Developing Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 899-912, June.
- Khemani, Stuti, 2007. "Does delegation of fiscal policy to an independent agency make a difference? Evidence from intergovernmental transfers in India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 464-484, March.
- Grossman, Philip J, 1994.
" A Political Theory of Intergovernmental Grants,"
Springer, vol. 78(3-4), pages 295-303, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.