This paper examines the impact of political competition on block grants from federal to subfederal levels of government. We model the extent and direction of income redistribution as determined proximately by the political agendas of central decisionmakers and, at a deeper level, by the institutions within which they find themselves operating.
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Paper provided by Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs in its series Papers with number
177.
Length: 19 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:priwpu:177
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Find related papers by JEL classification: H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
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