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Testing Models Of Distributive Politicsusing Exit Polls To Measure Voterpreferences And Partisanship

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Author Info

  • Valentino Larcinese
  • James M. Snyder, Jr.
  • Cecilia Testa

Abstract

This paper tests various hypotheses about distributive politics by studying the distributionof federal spending across U.S. states over the period 1978-2002. We improve onprevious work by using survey data to measure the share of voters in each state that areDemocrats, Republicans, and independents, or liberals, conservatives and moderates. Wefind no evidence for the "swing voter" hypothesis { that is, no significant associationbetween the amount of federal funds a state receives and the fraction of independents ormoderates in the state. We also find no evidence for the "battleground state" hypothesis -no significant association between the amount of federal funds and the degree of partisanbalance in a state. Modest support is found for the \partisan supporters" hypothesis, whichconjectures that politicians will favour areas that contain a large percentage of their coresupporters.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE in its series STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series with number 19.

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Date of creation: Apr 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cep:stipep:19

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Web page: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/default.asp

Related research

Keywords: Electoral competition; swing voter; partisanship; election closeness; USFederal Spending.;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Christian Bjørnskov & Niklas Potrafke, 2013. "The size and scope of government in the US states:Does party ideology matter?," Ifo Working Paper Series Ifo Working Paper No. 162, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
  2. Casey, Katherine, 2012. "Crossing Party Lines: The Effects of Information on Redistributive Politics," Research Papers 2099, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  3. Katherine Casey & Rachel Glennerster & Edward Miguel, 2014. "Healing the Wounds: Learning from Sierra Leone's Post-war Institutional Reforms," NBER Chapters, in: African Successes: Government and Institutions National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Marcelin Joanis, 2008. "The Road to Power: Partisan Loyalty and the Centralized Provision of Local Infrastructure," Cahiers de recherche 08-15, Departement d'Economique de la Faculte d'administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke.
  5. Potrafke, Niklas, 2013. "Economic Freedom and Government Ideology across the German States," Munich Reprints in Economics 19269, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  6. Katherine Casey & Rachel Glennerster & Edward Miguel, 2012. "Healing the Wounds: Learning from Sierra Leone's Post-war Institutional Reforms," NBER Working Papers 18368, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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