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The Political Economy of Publicly Provided Private Goods

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Author Info
Blomquist, S.
Christiansen, V.
Abstract

A large share of public funds is spent on private goods (education, health care, day care, etc.). This paper integrates two different approaches to the analysis of public provision of private goods. While normative public economies has established an efficiency case for such provision, the commonly helod political economy view has been that it is an economically inefficient phenomenon generated by the political process. The present paper argues that the central mechanism studied in the normative approach is equally relevant to voting models of decisions on public provision.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Uppsala - Working Paper Series in its series Papers with number 1998-14.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:uppaal:1998-14

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Keywords: POLITICAL ECONOMY ; PUBLIC GOODS ; GOODS;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Avinash Dixit & John Londregan, 1998. "Ideology, Tactics, And Efficiency In Redistributive Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 497-529, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1996. "Public Provision of Private Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 57-84, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Gouveia, Miguel, 1997. " Majority Rule and the Public Provision of a Private Good," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3-4), pages 221-44, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Roberts, Kevin W. S., 1977. "Voting over income tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 329-340, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Bruce, Neil & Waldman, Michael, 1991. "Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Nonpaternalistic," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1345-51, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Blomquist, Soren & Christiansen, Vidar, 1998. "Topping Up or Opting Out? The Optimal Design of Public Provision Schemes," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 399-411, May.
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  7. Henry Ohlsson & Michael Lundholm, 1998. "Wages, taxes and publicly provided day care," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 185-204. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Sören Blomquist & Vidar Christiansen, . "Price Subsidies versus Public Provision," EPRU Working Paper Series 97-08, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
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  9. Coate, Stephen, 1995. "Altruism, the Samaritan's Dilemma, and Government Transfer Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 46-57, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Blackorby, Charles & Donaldson, David, 1988. "Cash versus Kind, Self-selection, and Efficient Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 691-700, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Bergstrom, Ted & Blomquist, Soren, 1996. "The political economy of subsidized day care," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 443-457, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1991. "Public Provision of Private Goods and the Redistribution of Income," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 979-84, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 1997. "In-kind transfers, self-selection and optimal tax policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 97-114, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Nichols, Albert L & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1982. "Targeting Transfers through Restrictions on Recipients," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 372-77, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Blomquist, Suren & Christiansen, Vidar, 1995. " Public Provision of Private Goods as a Redistributive Device in an Optimum Income Tax Model," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 97(4), pages 547-67, December.
  17. Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1993. "A model of political equilibrium in a representative democracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 195-209, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E., 1996. "Ends against the middle: Determining public service provision when there are private alternatives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 297-325, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1998. "Competition between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 33-62, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Mark Gradstein & Moshe Justman, 1996. "The political economy of mixed public and private schooling: A dynamic analysis," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 297-310, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 796-805, September.
  22. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
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  23. Boadway, Robin & Marchand, Maurice, 1995. "The Use of Public Expenditures for Redistributive Purposes," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 45-59, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  24. Guesnerie, Roger & Roberts, Kevin, 1984. "Effective Policy Tools and Quantity Controls," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 59-86, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  25. Stern, Nicholas, 1982. "Optimum taxation with errors in administration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 181-211, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1987. "Pareto efficient and optimal taxation and the new new welfare economics," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 991-1042 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Soeren Blomquist & Vidar Christiansen, 2003. "Is there a Case for Public Provision of Private Goods if Preferences are Heterogeneous? An Example with Day Care," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  2. Alessandro Balestrino, 2000. "Mixed Tax Systems and the Public Provision of Private Goods," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 463-478, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Simona GRASSI, 2006. "On the characteristics of a mixed system of provision of a private good. An application to health care," Departemental Working Papers 2006-14, Department of Economics University of Milan Italy. [Downloadable!]
  4. Blomquist, Sören & Christiansen, Vidar, 2004. "Welfare Enhancing Marginal Tax Rates: The Case of Publicly Provided Day Care," Arbetsrapport 2004:6, Institute for Futures Studies. [Downloadable!]
  5. Friedrich Breyer, 2001. "Income Redistribution and the Political Economy of Social Health Insurance : Comparing Germany and Switzerland," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 253, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Sophia Delipalla & Owen O'Donnell, 1999. "The Political Economy of a Publicly Provided Private Good with Adverse Selection," Studies in Economics 9911, Department of Economics, University of Kent. [Downloadable!]
  7. Blomquist, Sören & Christiansen, Vidar, 2000. "Why Politicians Favor Redheads - A Theory of Tactical Horizontal Redistribution," Working Paper Series 2000:10, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Luciano Greco, 2006. "Optimal Redistribution With Productive Social Services," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0026, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno". [Downloadable!]
  9. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2008. "Toward an Efficiency Rationale for the Public Provision of Private Goods," NBER Working Papers 13827, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Andrew M. Cohen & Beth A. Freeborn & Brian McManus, 2007. "Competition and Crowding-Out among Public, Non-Profit and For-Profit Organizations: Evidence from Outpatient Substance Abuse Treatment," Working Papers 52, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary. [Downloadable!]
  11. Olivier Cadot & Lars-Hendrik Röller & Andreas Stephan, 2004. "Contribution to Productivity or Pork Barrel?: The Two Faces of Infrastructure Investment," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 458, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Zanola, Roberto, 2000. "Public goods versus publicly provided private goods in a two-class economy," P.O.L.I.S. department's Working Papers 12, Department of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS. [Downloadable!]
  13. Margarita Katsimi & Thomas Moutos, 2004. "Monopoly, Inequality and Redistribution via the Public Provision of Private Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Margaret McKenzie, 2005. "Privatisation and Economic Growth," Economics Series 2005_21, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
  15. Leonardo Gasparini & Santiago Pinto, 2005. "Equality of Opportunity and Optimal Cash and In-Kind Policies," Working Papers 0022, CEDLAS, Universidad Nacional de La Plata. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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