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On the Vote Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments

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Author Info
Dahlberg, M.
Johansson, E.

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Abstract

A couple of months before the Swedish election in 1998, the incumbent government distributed 2.3 billion SEK to 42 out of 115 applying municipalities. This was the first wave of a four-year long grant program intended to support local investment programs aimed at an ecological sustainable development. This temporary grant program differs from traditional intergovernmental grants in several aspects, most importantly in the sovereign decision making power given to the incumbent central government. In this paper we investigate whether there were any tactical motives behind the distribution of these grants. We find support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government used the grant program under study in order to win votes. In particular, we find strong support for the Lindbeck-Weibull/Dixit-Londregan model in which parties distribute transfers to regions where there are many swing voters. This result is statistically as well as economically significant. We do however not find any support for the model that predicts that the incumbent government transfer money to its own supporters.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Uppsala - Working Paper Series in its series Papers with number 1999:24.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:uppaal:1999:24

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Postal: UPPSALA UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, S-751 20 UPPSALA SWEDEN.
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Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
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Related research
Keywords: ECONOMICS VOTING GOVERNMENT

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Avinash Dixit & John Londregan, 1998. "Ideology, Tactics, And Efficiency In Redistributive Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 497-529, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. John Joseph Wallis, 1996. "What Determines the Allocation of National Government Grants to the States?," NBER Historical Working Papers 0090, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Johansson, Eva, 1999. "Intergovernmental Grants as a Tactical Instrument: Some Empirical Evidence from Swedish Municipalities," Working Paper Series 1999:10, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Grossman, Philip J, 1994. " A Political Theory of Intergovernmental Grants," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(3-4), pages 295-303, March.
  5. Wright, Gavin, 1974. "The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: An Econometric Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 56(1), pages 30-38, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Bungey, Mel & Grossman, Philip & Kenyon, Peter, 1991. "Explaining Intergovernmental Grants: Australian Evidence," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 23(4A), pages 659-68, Part A, A.
  7. Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1993. "A model of political equilibrium in a representative democracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 195-209, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Dixit, Avinash K & Londregan, John, 1994. "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 1054, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Levitt, Steven D & Snyder, James M, Jr, 1997. "The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 30-53, February.
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  10. Lin, Tsai-Fen & Schmidt, Peter, 1984. "A Test of the Tobit Specification against an Alternative Suggested by Cragg," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 66(1), pages 174-77, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Cecilia Testa & Valentino Larcinse & Leonzio Rizzo, 2004. "The power of the purse: what do the data say on US federal budget allocation to the states?"," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 151, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  2. Albert Solé-Ollé & Pilar Sorribas-Navarro, 2006. "The effects of partisan alignment on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers. Differences-in-differences estimates for Spain," Working Papers 2006-09, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Kevin Milligan & Michael Smart, 2005. "Regional Grants as Pork Barrel Politics," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  4. Pettersson-Lidbom, Per & Dahlberg, Matz, 2003. "An Empirical Approach for Evaluating Soft Budget Constraints," Working Paper Series 2003:28, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Hanes, Niklas, 2003. "Empirical Studies in Local Public Finance: Spillovers, Amalgamations, and Tactical Redistribution," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies 604, Umeå University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Valentino Larcinese & Leonzio Rizzo & Cecilia Testa, 2005. "Allocating the US Federal Budget to the States: the Impact of the President," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 03, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  7. Valentino Larcinese & James M. Snyder, Jr. & Cecilia Testa, 2006. "Testing Models Of Distributive Politicsusing Exit Polls To Measure Voterpreferences And Partisanship," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 19, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  8. Valentino Larcinese & Leonzio Rizzo & Cecilia Testa, 2004. "The Allocation of the US Federal Budget to the States: Evidence on the Power of the Purse," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/25, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
  9. Axel Dreher & Bernhard Boockmann, 2007. "Do Human Rights Offenders Oppose Human Rights Resolutions in the United Nations?," Working papers 07-163, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
  10. Christian Schultz, 2003. "Strategic Campaigns and Redistributive Politics," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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