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Intergovernmental Grants As A Tactical Instrument: Some Empirical Evidence from Swedish Municipalities

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Author Info
Johansson, E.

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Abstract

Are grants to Swedish municipalities tactical? In this essay, I derive testable implications from a theoretical voting model and test these on a panel of 255 Swedish municipalities, 1981 - 1995. In order to decide which regions that are politically powerful, both election results, and survey data from the Swedish election studies are used. The results, although somewhat ambiguous, support the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants are used in order to win votes.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Uppsala - Working Paper Series in its series Papers with number 1999:10.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:uppaal:1999:10

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Postal: UPPSALA UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, S-751 20 UPPSALA SWEDEN.
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Related research
Keywords: POLITICAL ECONOMY ; MUNICIPALITIES;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Avinash Dixit & John Londregan, 1998. "Ideology, Tactics, And Efficiency In Redistributive Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 497-529, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. John Joseph Wallis, 1996. "What Determines the Allocation of National Government Grants to the States?," NBER Historical Working Papers 0090, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Grossman, Philip J, 1994. " A Political Theory of Intergovernmental Grants," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(3-4), pages 295-303, March.
  4. Case, A, 1996. "Election Goals and Income Redistribution : Recent Evidence from Albania," Papers 177, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
    Other versions:
  5. Snyder, James M, 1989. "Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 637-60, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Bungey, Mel & Grossman, Philip & Kenyon, Peter, 1991. "Explaining Intergovernmental Grants: Australian Evidence," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 23(4A), pages 659-68, Part A, A.
  7. Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1993. "A model of political equilibrium in a representative democracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 195-209, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Dixit, Avinash K & Londregan, John, 1994. "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 1054, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Levitt, Steven D & Snyder, James M, Jr, 1997. "The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 30-53, February.
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  10. Eva Johansson, 2003. "Tactical Redistribution Between Regions When Parties and Voters Care About Ideology," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(1), pages 95-120, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Robert Dur & Klaas Staal, 2003. "National Interference in Local Public Good Provision," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-074/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  2. Wiji Arulampalam & Sugato Dasgupta & Amrita Dhillon & Bhaskar Dutta, 2008. "Electoral goals and center-state transfers: A Theoretical model and empirical evidence from India," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 08-14, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Jordahl, Henrik, 2001. "An Economic Analysis of Voting in Sweden," Working Paper Series 2001:18, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Dahlberg, Matz & Johansson, Eva, 1999. "On the Vote Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments," Working Paper Series 1999:24, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Robert Dur & Klaas Staal, 2006. "Local Public Good Provision, Municipal Consolidation, and National Transfers," Discussion Papers 86, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Achim Kemmerling & Andreas Stephan, 2001. "The Contribution of Local Public Infrastructure to Private Productivity and Its Political-Economy: Evidence from a Panel of Large German Cities," CIG Working Papers FS IV 01-14, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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