The Timing of Elections in Federations : A Disciplining Device against Soft Budget Constraints ?
AbstractWe introduce political economics into the soft budget constraint problem by asking if the timing of elections has the potential to harden budget constraints. Specifically, we ask under which circumstances the soft budget constraint problem is worse - with synchronized elections, i.e. simultaneous central and regional office terms, or with staggered elections, i.e. terms of office that do not coincide. We find that staggered elections clearly improve fiscal discipline at the local level as well as welfare.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne in its series Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne with number 10036.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2010
Date of revision:
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Soft budget constraints; fiscal federalism; elections.;
Other versions of this item:
- Karolina Kaiser & Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, 2013. "The timing of elections in federations: a disciplining device against soft budget constraints?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 197-215, March.
- Karolina Kaiser & Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, 2010. "The Timing of Elections in Federations : A Disciplining Device against Soft Budget Constraints ?," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00492085, HAL.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-06-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2010-06-18 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-PBE-2010-06-18 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2010-06-18 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 2013.
"Do bailouts buy votes? Evidence from a panel of Hessian municipalities,"
48228, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Thushyanthan Baskaran, 2013. "Do bailouts buy votes? Evidence from a panel of Hessian municipalities," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 257-278, August.
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