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The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government

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  • Shugart, Matthew Soberg

Abstract

Presidents often lack legislative majorities, but situations of opposition-party majorities (“divided government†) are much less common outside the United States. The president's party's share of seats tends to increase in early-term elections but decline in later elections. Thus opposition majorities often result after midterm elections. Opposition majorities rarely occur in elections held concurrently with the presidential election but are more likely to do so if legislators enjoy electoral independence from their parties due to features of electoral laws.

Suggested Citation

  • Shugart, Matthew Soberg, 1995. "The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(2), pages 327-343, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:89:y:1995:i:02:p:327-343_09
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    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2007. "A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(2), pages 267-286, January.
    2. Bunker, Kenneth, 2020. "A two-stage model to forecast elections in new democracies," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 1407-1419.
    3. Carlos Scartascini, 2007. "The Institutional Determinants of Political Transactions," Research Department Publications 4483, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    4. Burkhart, Simone, 2008. "Blockierte Politik: Ursachen und Folgen von "Divided Government" in Deutschland," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 60, number 60.
    5. Grigorii V Golosov, 2016. "Party system nationalisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Empirical evidence and an explanatory model," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 19(3), pages 231-248, September.
    6. Karolina Kaiser & Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, 2013. "The timing of elections in federations: a disciplining device against soft budget constraints?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 197-215, March.
    7. repec:gig:joupla:v:7:y:2015:i:1:p:111-142 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Matthew Shugart, 1999. "Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and the Provision of Collective Goods in Less-Developed Countries," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 53-88, March.
    9. Dean Lacy & Emerson M. S. Niou, 1998. "Elections in Double-Member Districts with Nonseparable Voter Preferences," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(1), pages 89-110, January.
    10. Beck, Thorsten & Clarke, George & Groff, Alberto & Keefer, Philip & Walsh, Patrick, 2000. "New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2283, The World Bank.
    11. Igor A. Mayburov & Anna P. Kireenko, 2018. "Tax reforms and elections in modern Russia," Journal of Tax Reform, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Ural Federal University, vol. 4(1), pages 73-94.
    12. Hallerberg, Mark & Marier, Patrick, 2001. "Executive authority, the personal vote, and budget discipline in Latin American and Carribean countries," ZEI Working Papers B 17-2001, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
    13. David J. Samuels & Matthew Soberg Shugart, 2003. "Presidentialism, Elections and Representation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 15(1), pages 33-60, January.
    14. Oleh Protsyk, 2006. "Intra‐Executive Competition between President and Prime Minister: Patterns of Institutional Conflict and Cooperation under Semi‐Presidentialism," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 54(2), pages 219-244, June.

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