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The Institutional Determinants of Political Transactions

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  • Scartascini, Carlos

Abstract

Public policies are the outcome of the interaction among a variety of key political actors, each with its own preferences and incentives, who meet in different arenas and interact within the constraints of the institutions that frame their engagement. Therefore, to recognize the reasons behind the success or failure of any public policy it is necessary to understand the countrys political institutions and the policymaking process they in turn help shape. This document looks at a number of those key actors, institutions, and arenas, with the aim of examining the roles, incentives, and capabilities of each of the actors in the policymaking process, by drawing from an extensive literature in political science and political economy. Each of the actors is looked at individually but connected to the other actors by linking the impact of political institutions on their incentives to the features of the policymaking game. Hopefully, this document will provide researchers with the tools necessary to embark in the fascinating analysis of policymaking processes not only for Latin American countries but also for other parts of the world.

Suggested Citation

  • Scartascini, Carlos, 2007. "The Institutional Determinants of Political Transactions," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1961, Inter-American Development Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:brikps:1961
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    2. Nevskij, Sergei, 2013. ""British disease": the factors of the economic crisis in the UK in 1970," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, pages 38-61, February.
    3. Richard C. Feiock & Soyoung Kim, 2021. "The Political Market and Sustainability Policy," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-9, March.
    4. Scartascini, Carlos & Stein, Ernesto H. & Tommasi, Mariano, 2008. "Political Institutions, State Capabilities and Public Policy: International Evidence," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1638, Inter-American Development Bank.
    5. Ronn Pineo, 2014. "The Free Market Experiment in Latin America," Journal of Developing Societies, , vol. 30(2), pages 169-194, June.
    6. Nantongo, Mary & Vatn, Arild, 2019. "Estimating Transaction Costs of REDD+," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 1-11.

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