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Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes and Policy Outcomes in Chile

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  • Aninat, Cristóbal
  • Londregan, John
  • Navia, Patricio
  • Vial, Joaquín

Abstract

This analysis characterizes the salient features of the policymaking process (PMP) in Chile. It emphasizes the influence of political institutions on the PMP and examines the linkage between policymaking and policy outcomes in Chile. The salient features of the Chilean PMP are the electoral system and the associated party system, characterized by two long-lived coalitions, a powerful Executive, with de facto control over the agenda, a relatively independent judiciary, a bureaucracy that is relatively free from corruption even by the standards of the OECD, and a series of veto points in the policymaking process that permit adversely affected actors to block policy change. Looking at policy areas in cross section, the authors find that policy areas in which policymakers' interests are more nearly aligned, and in which there is more rapid exogenous change, are associated with more successful efforts at reform, while in areas in which the interests of the Executive and the various veto players diverge, policy tends to stagnate.

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  • Aninat, Cristóbal & Londregan, John & Navia, Patricio & Vial, Joaquín, 2006. "Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes and Policy Outcomes in Chile," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 3371, Inter-American Development Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:brikps:3371
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    Cited by:

    1. Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi, 2012. "The Making of Policy: Institutionalized or Not?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(4), pages 787-801, October.
    2. Fabiana Machado & Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi, 2011. "Political Institutions and Street Protests in Latin America," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 55(3), pages 340-365, June.
    3. Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi & Ernesto Stein, 2010. "Veto Players and Policy Trade-Offs- An Intertemporal Approach to Study the Effects of Political Institutions on Policy," Research Department Publications 4660, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    4. Olavarria-Gambi Mauricio, 2017. "Policy Implementation: Lessons from the Chilean Policy on Public Management Modernization," Central European Journal of Public Policy, Sciendo, vol. 11(1), pages 41-54, June.
    5. Scartascini, Carlos & Stein, Ernesto H. & Tommasi, Mariano, 2008. "Veto Players, Intertemporal Interactions and Policy Adaptability: How Do Political Institutions Work?," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 3352, Inter-American Development Bank.
    6. Jeffrey Frankel, 2013. "A Solution to Fiscal Procyclicality: The Structural Budget Institutions Pioneered by Chile," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Luis Felipe Céspedes & Jordi Galí (ed.),Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Performance, edition 1, volume 17, chapter 9, pages 323-391, Central Bank of Chile.
    7. Carlos Scartascini, 2007. "Determinantes institucionales de transacciones políticas," Research Department Publications 4484, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    8. Murillo, Maria Victoria & Foulon, Carmen Le, 2006. "Crisis and policymaking in Latin America: The case of Chile's 1998-99 electricity crisis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(9), pages 1580-1596, September.
    9. Scartascini, Carlos, 2007. "The Institutional Determinants of Political Transactions," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1961, Inter-American Development Bank.
    10. Valeria Palanza & Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi, 2012. "On the Institutionalization of Congress(es) in Latin America and Beyond," Research Department Publications 4817, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    11. Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi & Ernesto H. Stein, 2008. "Un Enfoque Intertemporal Interactions and Policy Adaptability: How Do Political Institutions Work?," Research Department Publications 4594, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    12. Frankel, Jeffrey, 2011. "A Solution to Overoptimistic Forecasts and Fiscal Procyclicality: The Structural Budget Institutions Pioneered by Chile," Working Paper Series 11-012, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    13. Emmanuel Abuelafia & Sergio Berensztein & Miguel Braun & Luciano di Gresia, 2005. "Who Decides on Public Expenditures? A Political Economy Analysis of the Budget Process: The Case of Argentina," Public Economics 0511004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Murillo, Maria Victoria & Scartascini, Carlos & Tommasi, Mariano, 2008. "The Political Economy of Productivity: Actors, Arenas, and Policies. A Framework of Analysis," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1642, Inter-American Development Bank.
    15. Anil Hira & Kai Shiao, 2016. "Understanding the Deep Roots of Success in Effective Civil Services," Journal of Developing Societies, , vol. 32(1), pages 17-43, March.
    16. Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, 2008. "Chile’s Growth and Development: Leadership, Policy-Making Process, Policies, and Results," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 507, Central Bank of Chile.
    17. Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, 2012. "The Political Economy of Distribution and Growth in Chile," Documentos de Trabajo 417, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..

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