The Making of Policy: Institutionalized or Not?
AbstractThis paper develops a framework for analyzing different policymaking styles, their causes and their consequences in Latin America, finding that lower institutionalization and greater use of alternative political technologies (APTs) are more likely the lower the cost of using these technologies, the higher the potential damage they can cause, the lower the wealth of the economy, and the more asymmetric the distribution of de jure political power. Moreover, strategic complementarity exists in the use of alternative political technologies; for instance "bribes by the rich" and "protests by the poor" are likely to be countervailing forces, and will both occur in polities with weaker political institutions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 4644.
Date of creation: Nov 2009
Date of revision:
Political institutions; Public policies; Institutional strength; Protests; Alternative Political Technologies; Development; Judicial independence; Party institutionalization; Congress capabilities; Cabinet stability; Corruption;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
- H89 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Other
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-12-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-12-11 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2009-12-11 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Oscar Becerra & Eduardo Cavallo & Carlos Scartascini, 2010.
"The Politics of Financial Development - The Role of Interest Groups and Government Capabilities,"
Research Department Publications
4686, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Becerra, O. & Cavallo, E. & Scartascini, C., 2012. "The politics of financial development: The role of interest groups and government capabilities," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 626-643.
- Martin Ardanaz & Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi, 2010. "Political Institutions, Policymaking, and Economic Policy in Latin America," Research Department Publications 4658, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Martin Ardanaz & Carlos Scartascini, 2011. "Why Don’t We Tax the Rich? Inequality, Legislative Malapportionment, and Personal Income Taxation around the World," Research Department Publications 4724, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Martin Ardanaz & Marcelo Leiras & Mariano Tommasi, 2012. "The Politics of Federalism in Argentina: Implications for Governance and Accountability," Research Department Publications 4781, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
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