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Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions

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Roger Lagunoff

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 122247000000000876.

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Date of creation: 14 Mar 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000876

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  1. Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 2003. "A Social Choice Lemma on Voting over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games," Working Papers 1163, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Kalandrakis, Anastassios, 2004. "A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 294-322, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Barbera, S. & Maschler, M. & Shalev, J., 2001. "Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 40-78, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "Dynamic Enfranchisement," Wallis Working Papers WP36, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Roberts, Kevin W. S., 1977. "Voting over income tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 329-340, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Hassler, John & Krusell, Per & Storesletten, Kjetil & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2005. "The dynamics of government," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1331-1358, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Armando Gomes & Philippe Jehiel, 2005. "Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(3), pages 626-667, June.
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  9. Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1990. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 37-49, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Krusell, Per & Kuruscu, Burhanettin & Smith Jr., Anthony A, 2001. "Equilibrium Welfare and Government Policy with Quasi-Geometric Discounting," CEPR Discussion Papers 2693, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Krusell, Per & Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor, 1996. "Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and Growth," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(2), pages 301-29, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Justman, Moshe & Gradstein, Mark, 1999. "The Industrial Revolution, Political Transition, and the Subsequent Decline in Inequality in 19th-Century Britain," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 109-127, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Horst, Ulrich, 2005. "Stationary equilibria in discounted stochastic games with weakly interacting players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 83-108, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Amir, Rabah, 1996. "Continuous Stochastic Games of Capital Accumulation with Convex Transitions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 111-131, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Bernheim & Slavov, 2009. "A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 76(1), pages 33-62, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2001. "A Theory of Political Transitions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 938-963, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Montrucchio, Luigi, 1987. "Lipschitz continuous policy functions for strongly concave optimization problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 259-273, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Lagunoff, Roger, 1992. "Fully Endogenous Mechanism Selection on Finite Outcome Sets," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 465-80, October.
  20. Roger Lagunoff, 1997. "A Theory of Constitutional Standards and Civil Liberty," Game Theory and Information 9707004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  21. Jordan, J.S., 2006. "Pillage and property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 26-44, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible Communication in Dynastic Government," Wallis Working Papers WP34, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
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  23. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000. "Why Did The West Extend The Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, And Growth In Historical Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  24. Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Krusell, Per & Quadrini, Vincenzo & Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor, 1997. "Politico-economic equilibrium and economic growth," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 243-272, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Mark Gradstein, 2007. "Inequality, democracy and the protection of property rights," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(516), pages 252-269, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2006. "Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions," NBER Working Papers 12108, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  28. Curtat, Laurent O., 1996. "Markov Equilibria of Stochastic Games with Complementarities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 177-199, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  29. J. Scheinkman & U. Horst, 2003. "Equilibria in Systems of Social Interactions," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers d5a39039d26e0b08775b915bf, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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  30. Paul Klein & Per Krusell & José-Víctor Ríos-Rull, 2004. "Time-Consistent Public Expenditures," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000652, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  31. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  32. Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 2002. "Choosing How to Choose: Self Stable Majority Rules," Microeconomics 0211003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  33. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
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  34. Matthias Messner & Mattias K. Polborn, 2004. "Voting on Majority Rules," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(1), pages 115-132, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  35. Mertens, J.-F. & Parthasarathy, T., 1987. "Equilibria for discounted stochastic games," CORE Discussion Papers 1987050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  36. Mertens, Jean-Francois, 2002. "Stochastic games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 47, pages 1809-1832 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Egorov, Georgy & Guriev, Sergei & Sonin, Konstantin, 2006. "Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives and the Resource Curse," CEPR Discussion Papers 5748, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Gradstein, M., 2007. "Institutional Traps and Economic Growth," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0769, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  3. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2007. "Majority Rule Dynamics with Endogenous Status Quo," Wallis Working Papers WP46, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  4. John Duggan & Tasos Kalandrakis, 2007. "Dynamic Legislative Policy Making," Wallis Working Papers WP45, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  5. Egorov, Georgy & Sonin, Konstantin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession," CEPR Discussion Papers 5092, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Politics of Succession," Game Theory and Information 0505003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  7. William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2005. "Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000534, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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