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Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics William Jack
Roger Lagunoff
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number
784828000000000534.
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Date of creation: 04 Nov 2005Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000534Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978.
"Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Barbera, S. & Maschler, M. & Shalev, J., 2001.
"Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 40-78, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Roberts, Kevin W. S., 1977.
"Voting over income tax schedules ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 329-340, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roger Lagunoff, 2005.
"Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions ,"
Game Theory and Information
0505006, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Roger Lagunoff & William Jack, 2004.
"Dynamic Enfranchisement ,"
2004 Meeting Papers
466, Society for Economic Dynamics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2003.
"Dynamic Enfranchisement ,"
Public Economics
0306002, EconWPA, revised 01 Jul 2003.
[Downloadable!] Roger Lagunoff & William Jack, 2004.
"Dynamic Enfranchisement ,"
Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings
24, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!] William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2003.
"Dynamic Enfranchisement ,"
Wallis Working Papers
WP36, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
[Downloadable!] William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, .
"Dynamic Enfrachisement ,"
Working Papers
gueconwpa~03-03-03, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2003.
"Dynamic Enfranchisement ,"
Levine's Bibliography
666156000000000030, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Jack, William & Lagunoff, Roger, 2006.
"Dynamic enfranchisement ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 551-572, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Justman, Moshe & Gradstein, Mark, 1999.
"The Industrial Revolution, Political Transition, and the Subsequent Decline in Inequality in 19th-Century Britain ,"
Explorations in Economic History ,
Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 109-127, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2001.
"A Theory of Political Transitions ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 938-963, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000.
"Why Did The West Extend The Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, And Growth In Historical Perspective ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996.
"Majority voting with single-crossing preferences ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alessandro Lizzeri & Nicola Persico, 2004.
"Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, With an Application to Britain's "Age of Reform" ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 119(2), pages 705-763, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roger Lagunoff, 2007.
"Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions ,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000000876, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
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Jinhui Bai & Roger Lagunoff, 2007.
"On the “Faustian” Dynamics of Policy and Political Power ,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000001627, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
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