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Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution

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Author Info
Salvador Barberà (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)
Michael Maschler (Hebrew University)
Jonathan Shalev (CORE)

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Abstract

We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions: the founders and the candidates are fixed; the society operates for $k$ periods and holds elections at the beginning of each period; one vote is sufficient for admission, and voters can support as many candidates as they wish; voters assess the value of the streams of agents with whom they share the society, while they belong to it. In spite of these simplifications, we show that interesting strategic behavior is implied by the dynamic structure of the problem: the vote for friends may be postponed, and it may be advantageous to vote for enemies. We discuss the existence of different types of equilibria in pure strategies and point out interesting equilibria in mixed strategies.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9804001.

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Length: 1 pages
Date of creation: 16 Apr 1998
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9804001

Note: Type of Document - AMSTeX; prepared on IBM PC; to print on PostScript; pages: 1+48 ; figures: included
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Related research
Keywords: voting elections clubs game theory noncooperative games pure-strategy equilibrium profiles refinements

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000051, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. D. Berga & G. Bergantiños & J. Massó & A. Neme, 2006. "On Exiting After Voting," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 33-54, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Giovanni Maggi & Massimo Morelli, 2003. "Self Enforcing Voting in International Organizations," NBER Working Papers 10102, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Giovanni Maggi & Massimo Morelli, 2006. "Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1137-1158, September.
  5. Roger Lagunoff, 2005. "Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions," Game Theory and Information 0501003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Roger A. McCain, 2003. "Specifying Agents: Probabilistic Equilibrium with Reciprocity," Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 9, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 47, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Gary Biglaiser & James Friedman, 2004. "Membership Diversity in Club Decisions," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(1), pages 1188-1188. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Francesc Ortega, 2004. "Immigration and the Survival of the Welfare State," Economics Working Papers 815, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  10. Joel Sobel, 1998. "On the Dynamics of Standards," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 97-15r, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2005. "Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000534, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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