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Workers of the world, unite! Franchise extensions and the threat of revolution in Europe, 1820-1938

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Author Info

  • Aidt, Toke S.

    ()
    (Faculty of Economics)

  • Jensen, Peter S.

    ()
    (Department of Business and Economics)

Abstract

This paper tests the hypothesis that the extension of the voting franchise was caused by the threat of revolution, as suggested by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). We approximate the threat of revolution in a given country by revolutionary events happening in neighboring countries. We investigate the relationship between this new measure of the threat of revolution and measures of suffrage reform in two samples of European countries covering the period from 1820 to 1938. We find strong support for the ‘threat of revolution theory’. We also find some evidence that war triggered suffrage reform, whereas ‘modernization theory’ receives little support.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark in its series Discussion Papers of Business and Economics with number 7/2010.

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Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: 18 Oct 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2010_007

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Postal: Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, DK-5230 Odense M, Denmark
Phone: 65 50 32 33
Fax: 65 50 32 37
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Web page: http://www.sdu.dk/ivoe
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Keywords: The extension of the voting franchise; democracy; threat of revolution; suffrage;

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References

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  32. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521855266 is not listed on IDEAS
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Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Middle Class Rising?
    by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson in Why Nations Fail on 2013-07-02 06:39:00
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Cited by:
  1. Daron Acemoglu & Suresh Naidu & Pascual Restrepo & James A. Robinson, 2013. "Democracy, Redistribution and Inequality," NBER Working Papers 19746, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Toke Aidt & Peter Jensen, 2013. "Democratization and the size of government: evidence from the long 19th century," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 157(3), pages 511-542, December.
  3. Hans Degryse & Thomas Lambert & Armin Schwienbacher, 2013. "The Political Economy of Financial Systems: Evidence from Suffrage Reforms in the Last Two Centuries," CESifo Working Paper Series 4527, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Baten, Joerg & Mumme, Christina, 2013. "Does inequality lead to civil wars? A global long-term study using anthropometric indicators (1816–1999)," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 56-79.
  5. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2013. "Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice," NBER Working Papers 18921, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Buchheim, Lukas & Ulbricht, Robert, 2014. "Emergence and Persistence of Extreme Political Systems," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University 461, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  7. Aidt, T.S. & Jensen, P.S., 2012. "From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge 1221, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  8. Braunfels, Elias, 2014. "How do Political and Economic Institutions Affect Each Other?," Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics 19/2014, Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics.
  9. Frederik Toscani, 2013. "Why High Human Capital Makes Good Revolutionaries: The Role of the Middle Classes in Democratisation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge 1332, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.

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