Democratization as a cost-saving device

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Democratization as a cost-saving device

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Luis Angeles

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Luis Angeles

Abstract

We propose a theoretical analysis of democratization processes in which an elite extends the franchise to the poor when threatened with a revo- lution. The poor could govern without changing the political system by maintaining a continuous revolutionary threat on the elite. Revolutionary threats, however, are costly to the poor and democracy is a superior sys- tem in which political agreement is reached through costless voting. This provides a rationale for democratic transitions that has not been discussed in the literature

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Glasgow in its series Working Papers with number 2008_31.

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Date of creation: Nov 2008
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Handle: RePEc:gla:glaewp:2008_31

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2008-12-14 (All new papers)
NEP-CDM-2008-12-14 (Collective Decision-Making)
NEP-POL-2008-12-14 (Positive Political Economics)

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Fleck, Robert K & Hanssen, F Andrew, 2006. "The Origins of Democracy: A Model with Application to Ancient Greece," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(1), pages 115-46, April.
Roger Lagunoff & William Jack, 2004. "Dynamic Enfranchisement," 2004 Meeting Papers 466, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "Dynamic Enfranchisement," Public Economics 0306002, EconWPA, revised 01 Jul 2003. [Downloadable!]
- Roger Lagunoff & William Jack, 2004. "Dynamic Enfranchisement," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 24, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
- William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "Dynamic Enfranchisement," Wallis Working Papers WP36, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
- William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, . "Dynamic Enfrachisement," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-03, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "Dynamic Enfranchisement," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000030, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Jack, William & Lagunoff, Roger, 2006. "Dynamic enfranchisement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 551-572, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000. "Why Did The West Extend The Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, And Growth In Historical Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A, 1998. "Why did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 1797, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alessandro Lizzeri & Nicola Persico, 2004. "Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, With an Application to Britain's "Age of Reform"," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(2), pages 705-763, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Daron Acemoglu, 2008. "Oligarchic Versus Democratic Societies," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(1), pages 1-44, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Daron Acemoglu, 2007. "Oligarchic Versus Democratic Societies," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 47, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2006. "Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions," NBER Working Papers 12108, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A, 2006. "Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5603, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2008. "Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 267-93, March. [Downloadable!]
repec:cup:cbooks:9780521671422 is not listed on IDEAS
Matteo Cervellati & Piergiuseppe Fortunato & Uwe Sunde, 2008. "Hobbes to Rousseau: Inequality, Institutions and Development," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(531), pages 1354-1384, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Cervellati, Matteo & Fortunato, Piergiuseppe & Sunde, Uwe, 2005. "Hobbes to Rousseau: Inequality, Institutions, and Development," IZA Discussion Papers 1450, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 108(4), pages 703-725, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- William Jack (Georgetown University) and Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), . "Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model," Working Papers gueconwpa~05-05-15, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2005. "Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000534, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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