Inequality, Development, and the Stability of Democracy -Lipset and Three Critical Junctures in German History
AbstractThis paper studies the endogenous emergence of political regimes in societies in which productive resources are distributed unequally and institutions do not ensure political commitments. The results imply that for any level of development there exists a distribution of resources such that democracy emerges in equilibrium, but there are distributions of resources for which democracy is infeasible in equilibrium irrespective of the level of development. The model also delivers results on the stability of democracy with regard to changes in the economic and demographic environment. The results are consistent with the different political regimes that emerged in Germany after 1871.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 8406.
Date of creation: Jun 2011
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- Jung, Florian & Sunde, Uwe, 2011. "Inequality, Development, and the Stability of Democracy – Lipset and Three Critical Junctures in German History," Economics Working Paper Series 1127, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-06-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-06-11 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-HIS-2011-06-11 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-POL-2011-06-11 (Positive Political Economics)
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