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Consensual and Conflictual Democratization

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Author Info
Matteo Cervellati () (University of Bologna, IAE Barcelona and IZA Bonn)
Piergiuseppe Fortunato () (University of Bologna)
Uwe Sunde () (IZA Bonn and University of Bonn)

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Abstract

We study the process of endogenous democratization from inefficient oligarchic systems in an economy where heterogeneous individuals can get involved in predation activities. The features of democracies are shown to be crucially related to the conditions under which democratization initially takes place. The political regime and the extent of redistribution implemented under it depend on the allocation of de facto political power across the different social groups. The cost of public enforcement of property rights depends on the extent of predation activities in the economy. The theory highlights the importance of inequality in natural resources and availability of human capital for endogenous democratic transitions. Multiple politico-economic equilibria can be sustained conditional on expectations about property rights enforcement. This generates history dependence. Democratic transitions supported by a large consensus serve as coordination device and lead to better protection of property and more stable political systems than democratic transitions imposed in conflictual environments. We test the novel predictions using available cross-country data. The link between the type of democratic transition and the outcomes under democracy is also investigated using novel data on constitutional principles. The findings support the theoretical predictions.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 2225.

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Length: 53 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2006
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Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2225

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Related research
Keywords: democratization; oligarchy; conflict; consensual democracy; inequality; commitment; constitutional principles;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
O20 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - General
N10 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Growth and Fluctuations - - - General, International, or Comparative

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  1. Gradstein, M., 2007. "Institutional Traps and Economic Growth," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0769, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jinhui Bai & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "On the 'Faustian' Dynamics of Policy and Political Power," Working Papers gueconwpa~08-08-02, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Gradstein, Mark, 2007. "Institutional Traps and Economic Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 6414, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Roger Lagunoff, . "The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-07, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), . "Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions," Working Papers gueconwpa~05-05-07, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Uwe Sunde, 2006. "Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und Demokratie: Ist Demokratie ein Wohlstandsmotor oder ein Wohlstandsprodukt?," IZA Discussion Papers 2244, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-23.


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