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Democratization and Civil Liberties: The Role of Violence During the Transition

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  • Cervellati, Matteo
  • Fortunato, Piergiuseppe
  • Sunde, Uwe

Abstract

This paper investigates the role of violent civil conflicts during the process of democratization for the quality of emerging democracies, and in particular, the protection of civil (political and economic) liberties. A simple theory in which different groups may engage in violent conflict in order to become the ruler predicts a crucial role of the democratization scenario. A peaceful democratization leads to democracies with a high degree of civil liberties, reflecting a social contract according to which all groups are politically represented and the rulers deliberately abstain from wasteful rent extraction. A transition to democracy under a violent conflict is less likely to lead to a system with a high degree of civil liberties. Empirical evidence from the third wave of democratization based on a difference-indifference methodology supports the theoretical predictions. The findings suggest that violent conflicts during the democratic transition have persistent negative effects on the quality of the emerging democracies.

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  • Cervellati, Matteo & Fortunato, Piergiuseppe & Sunde, Uwe, 2011. "Democratization and Civil Liberties: The Role of Violence During the Transition," Economics Working Paper Series 1108, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:usg:econwp:2011:08
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    Cited by:

    1. Cervellati, Matteo & Sunde, Uwe, 2011. "Democratization, Violent Social Conflicts, and Growth," IZA Discussion Papers 5643, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Piergiuseppe Fortunato & Ugo Panizza, 2015. "Democracy, education and the quality of government," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 333-363, December.
    3. Cervellati Matteo & Fortunato Piergiuseppe & Sunde Uwe, 2012. "Consensual and Conflictual Democratization," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-51, December.
    4. Piergiuseppe Fortunato, 2015. "Democratic Government and Development: A Survey," Asian Development Review, MIT Press, vol. 32(2), pages 153-177, September.
    5. Matteo Cervellati & Piergiuseppe Fortunato & Uwe Sunde, 2015. "Roots and Fruits of Democracy: Natural Resources, Income Distribution and Social Violence," World Economic Review, World Economics Association, vol. 2015(4), pages 1-27, February.

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    JEL classification:

    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • N10 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • O20 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - General

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