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Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model

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Author Info
William Jack (Georgetown University) and Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University) () (Department of Economics, Georgetown University)

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Abstract

This paper studies the evolution of political institutions in the face of conflict. We examine institutional reform in a class of pivotal mechanisms — institutions that behave as if the resulting policy were determined by a “pivotal” decision maker drawn from the potential population of citizens and who holds full policy-making authority at the time. A rule-of-succession describes the process by which pivotal decision makers in period t + 1 are, themselves, chosen by pivotal decision makers in period t. Two sources of conflict - class conflict, arising from differences in wealth, and ideological conflict, arising from differences in preferences are examined. In each case, we characterize the unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the associated dynamic political game, and show that public decision-making authority evolves monotonically downward in wealth and upward in ideological predisposition toward the public good. We then examine rules-of-succession when ideology and wealth exhibit correlation. Classification-JEL Codes: C73, D72, D78

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Paper provided by Georgetown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number gueconwpa~05-05-15.

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Handle: RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~05-05-15

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Keywords: Social Conflict; Rule of Succession; Dynamic political game;

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Barbera, S. & Maschler, M. & Shalev, J., 2001. "Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 40-78, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Roberts, Kevin W. S., 1977. "Voting over income tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 329-340, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Roger Lagunoff, 2005. "Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions," Game Theory and Information 0505006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Justman, Moshe & Gradstein, Mark, 1999. "The Industrial Revolution, Political Transition, and the Subsequent Decline in Inequality in 19th-Century Britain," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 109-127, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Roger Lagunoff & William Jack, 2004. "Dynamic Enfranchisement," 2004 Meeting Papers 466, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2001. "A Theory of Political Transitions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 938-963, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000. "Why Did The West Extend The Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, And Growth In Historical Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Alessandro Lizzeri & Nicola Persico, 2004. "Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, With an Application to Britain's "Age of Reform"," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(2), pages 705-763, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000876, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  12. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521671422 is not listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Luis Angeles, 2008. "Democratization as a cost-saving device," Working Papers 2008_31, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jinhui Bai & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "On the 'Faustian' Dynamics of Policy and Political Power," Working Papers gueconwpa~08-08-02, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Roger Lagunoff, . "The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-07, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), . "Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions," Working Papers gueconwpa~05-05-07, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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