Voting for voters: a model of electoral evolution
AbstractWe model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions: the founders and the candidates are fixed; the society operates for k periods and holds elections at the beginning of each period; one vote is sufficient for admission, and voters can support as many candidates as theywish; voters assess the value of the streams of agents with whom they share the society, while they belong to it. In spite of these simplifications, we show that interesting strategic behavior is implied by the dynamic structure of theproblem: the vote for friends may be postponed, and it may be advantageous to vote for enemies. We discuss the existence of different types of equilibria in pure strategies and point out interesting equilibria in mixed strategies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1998022.
Date of creation: 01 Apr 1998
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Linear programming; interior-point methods; target following methods;
Other versions of this item:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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