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Unique stability in simple coalition formation games

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Papai, Szilvia
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 48 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 337-354
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:48:y:2004:i:2:p:337-354

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. Noemí Navarro, 2008. "A Sensitive Flexible Network Approach," Working Papers 2008-2, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center, revised Sep 2008. [Downloadable!]
  2. Gabrielle Demange, 2006. "The strategy structure of some coalition formation games," PSE Working Papers 2006-38, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez, 2005. "Strategy-Proof Coalition Formation," Economics Working Papers we055525, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Robert P. Gilles & Emiliya Lazarova & Pieter H.M. Ruys, 2006. "On Socio-economic Roles and Specialization," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-035/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  5. Alison Watts, 2006. "Formation of Segregated and Integrated Groups," Working Papers 2006.127, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  6. Gilles, Robert P. & Lazarova, Emiliya A. & Ruys, Pieter H.M., 2006. "Stability, specialization and social recognition," Discussion Paper 17, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Vincent Iehlé, 2005. "The core-partition of hedonic games," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b05091, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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