Stability of Matchings when Individuals Have Preferences Over Colleagues

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Stability of Matchings when Individuals Have Preferences Over Colleagues

Author Info

Dutta, B.
Masso, J.

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Abstract

In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can each be matched to a set of agents ( the individuals) on the other side of the market, and the individuals only have preferences defined over institutions ti which they can be matched. We explicitly study the consequences for stability when the composition of one's coworkers or colleagues can affect the preferences over institutions.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 325.96.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:325.96

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Related research
Keywords: LABOUR MARKET;

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Article
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Masso, Jordi, 1997. "Stability of Matchings When Individuals Have Preferences over Colleagues," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 464-475, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J40 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - General
J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Pablo Revilla, 2007. "Many-to-One Matching when Colleagues Matter," Working Papers 2007.87, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Pablo Revilla, 2004. "Many-to-one Matching When Colleagues Matter," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2004/85, Centro de Estudios Andaluces. [Downloadable!]
David Pérez-Castrillo & Marilda Sotomayor, 2003. "A Selling Mechanism," Revista Brasileira de Economia, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil), vol. 57(4), April. [Downloadable!]
Echenique, Federico & Yenmez, Mehmet B., 2005. "A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues," Working Papers 1226, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Federico Echenique, 2005. "A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues," Game Theory and Information 0506005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- Federico Echenique & Mehmet B. Yenmez, 2005. "A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues," Working Papers 2005.120, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
- Echenique, Federico & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2007. "A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 46-71, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ruth Mart?ez & Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es & Alejandro Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2003. "On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 577.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Ruth Martínez & Jordi Massó & Alejdanro Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2004. "On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 115-128, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Christian Roessler & Philipp Koellinger, 2009. "Firm Formation with Complementarities: The Role of the Entrepreneur," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-003/3, Tinbergen Institute, revised 03 Jun 2009. [Downloadable!]
Echenique, Federico & Oviedo, Jorge, 2003. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," Working Papers 1185, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Federico Echenique & Jorge Oviedo, 2004. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets," Game Theory and Information 0401002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- Jorge Oviedo & Federico Echenique, 2005. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," 2005 Meeting Papers 233, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
- Federico Echenique & Jorge Oviedo, 2003. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000374, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
- Echenique, Federico & Oviedo, Jorge, 2006. "A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(2), pages 233-273, June. [Downloadable!]
Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez, 2005. "Strategy-Proof Coalition Formation," Economics Working Papers we055525, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Carmelo Rodríguez Álvarez, 2006. "Strategy-Proof Coalition Formation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2006/11, Centro de Estudios Andaluces. [Downloadable!]
- Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, 2009. "Strategy-proof coalition formation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 431-452, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
BARBERA, Salvador & BOSSERT, Walter & PATTANAIK, Prasanta K., 2001. "Ranking Sets of Objects," Cahiers de recherche 2001-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Barbera, S. & Bossert, W. & Pattanaik, P.K., 2001. "Ranking Sets of Objects," Cahiers de recherche 2001-02, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
Dinko Dimitrov & Emiliya Lazarova, 2008. "Coalitional Matchings," Working Papers 2008.45, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
David Cantala, 2004. "Matching Markets: the Particular Case of Couples," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(45), pages 1-11. [Downloadable!]

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