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Exchange-Proofness or Divorce-Proofness? Stability in One-Sided Matching Markets

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  • José Alcalde

    ()
    (Universidad de Alicante)

Abstract

Two stability concepts for one-sided matching markets are analyzed: Gale- Chapley stability and S-stability. The first one applies best to markets were no status quo allocation is considered, whereas the second one is a solution to be used when property rights are allowed. A common problem of existence is shared by both solution concepts. Hence, we study economic environments where this problem does not exist, and present a family of agents' preferences for which existence is guaranteed for both Gale-Shapley stable and t-stable outcomes.

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File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-1995-04.pdf
File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 1995
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 1995-04.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Jan 1995
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by Ivie
Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1995-04

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Related research

Keywords: Matching marlqets; Rooinmate prohlem; Stahilit y.;

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References

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  1. Roth,Alvin E. & Sotomayor,Marilda A. Oliveira, 1992. "Two-Sided Matching," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521437882, November.
  2. Amparo Urbano Salvador & María Dolores Alepuz Domenech, 1994. "Market learning and price-dispersion," Working Papers. Serie AD 1994-14, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  3. Martin Shubik, 1969. "The 'Bridge Game' Economy," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 267, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  4. Herrero, Carmen & Villar, Antonio, 1991. "Vector mappings with diagonal images," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 57-67, August.
  5. José Alcalde, 1995. "Exchange-Proofness or Divorce-Proofness? Stability in One-Sided Matching Markets," Working Papers. Serie AD 1995-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  6. Alcalde, J. & Barberà, S., 1992. "Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 196.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  7. Subir K. Chattopadhyay, 1996. "Pareto optimal improvements for sunspots: The golden rule as a target for stabilization," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 123-135.
  8. Amparo Urbano Salvador & Larry Samuelson & Leonard J. Mirman, 1990. "Monopoly experimentation," Working Papers. Serie AD 1990-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    • Mirman, Leonard J & Samuelson, Larry & Urbano, Amparo, 1993. "Monopoly Experimentation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(3), pages 549-63, August.
  9. Nikolai S. Kukushkin, 1993. "Cournot Oligopoly With "Almost" Identical Convex Costs," Working Papers. Serie AD 1993-07, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  10. Begoña Subiza Martínez, 1993. "Numerical Representation Of Acyclic Preferences," Working Papers. Serie AD 1993-09, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  11. Marhuenda, F, 1995. "Distribution of Income and Aggregation of Demand," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 647-66, May.
  12. Miguel Ginés Vilar & Francisco Marhuenda, 1995. "Cost Monotonic Mecanisms," Working Papers. Serie AD 1995-01, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  13. José Alcalde, 1995. "Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 1995-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. José Alcalde & Pablo Revilla, 2003. "Researching with Whom? Stability and Manipulation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/35, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  2. Alcalde, José & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2011. "Fair School Placement," QM&ET Working Papers 11-1, Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica.
  3. José Alcalde & Pablo Revilla, 2001. "Tops Responsiveness, Strategy-Proofness And Coalition Formation Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-11, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  4. José Alcalde, 1995. "Exchange-Proofness or Divorce-Proofness? Stability in One-Sided Matching Markets," Working Papers. Serie AD 1995-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  5. MAULEON, Ana & MOLIS, Elena & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent & VERGOTE , Wouter, 2013. "Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems," CORE Discussion Papers 2013052, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Klumpp, Tilman, 2009. "Two-sided matching with spatially differentiated agents," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(5-6), pages 376-390, May.
  7. MAULEON, Ana & MOLIS, Elena & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent & VERGOTE, Wouter, 2011. "Absolutely stable roommate problems," CORE Discussion Papers 2011029, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi & Tayfun Sonmez, 1999. "Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 449, Boston College Department of Economics.
  9. Luis Corchón & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1995. "A Note On Stability Of Best Reply And Gradient Systems With Applications To Imperfectly Competitive Models," Working Papers. Serie AD 1995-18, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  10. Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Unique Stability in Simple Coalition Formation Games," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1537, Econometric Society.

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