Fernando Vega Redondo (Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas)
Abstract
When far-sighted agents may adjust their behavior only gradually , the issue of equilibrium selection in games becomes one of tension between "history" and "expectations". This paper analyzes whether, in this context, a planner may intervene successfully through short-run policies which redirect expectations away from the inertia of undesired history. The possibilities and limitations of such approach to "expectation management" are studied in a game-theoretic framework where both the planner and the population are involved in a struggle to impose their (credible) commitment possibilities.
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Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number
1993-05.
Length: 42 pages Date of creation: Jul 1993 Date of revision: Publication status: Published by Ivie Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1993-05
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Akihiko Matsui & Kiminori Matsuyama, 1991.
"An Approach to Equilibrium Selection,"
Discussion Papers
1065, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
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Akihiko Matsui & Kiminori Matsuyama, 1990.
"An Approach to Equilibrium Selection,"
Discussion Papers
970, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Jovanovic, Boyan & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1986.
"Anonymous Sequential Games,"
Working Papers
86-12, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
[Downloadable!]
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