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The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus

In: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

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Maschler, Michael
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This chapter was published in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.) Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, , chapter 18, pages 591-667, 1992.

This item is provided by Elsevier in its series Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications with number 1-18.

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This chapter was published in the following book, which is listed on IDEAS:
R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 1992. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Massimo Morelli & Maria Montero, 2001. "The Stable Demand Set General Characterization and Application to Majority Games," Working Papers 01-03, Ohio State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Lazarova, Emiliya & Borm, Peter & Montero, Maria & Reijnierse, Hans, 2006. "A bargaining set based on external and internal stability and endogenous coalition formation," Discussion Paper 16, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  9. Plambeck, Erica L. & Taylor, Terry A., 2004. "Implications of Renegotiation for Optimal Contract Flexibility and Investment," Research Papers 1889, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
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