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On Stability and Efficiency in School Choice Problems

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  • Alcalde, Jose
  • Romero-Medina, Antonio

Abstract

This paper proposes a way to allocate students to schools such that conciliates Pareto efficiency and stability. Taking as a starting point the recent reform proposed by the Boston School Committee, we propose a marginal modification to reach our objective redefine how students are prioritize. Our proposal is to allow schools to prioritize only a small set of students an then use a common priority order for the rest. Under this condition we propose a score based priority ranking that makes the output of the new Boston Mechanism Pareto efficient and stable.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28831/
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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28891/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 28831.

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Date of creation: 13 Feb 2011
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:28831

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Keywords: School allocation problem; Pareto efficient matching;

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References

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  1. Alcalde, Jose & Barbera, Salvador, 1994. "Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 417-35, May.
  2. Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January.
  3. José Alcalde, 1994. "Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 275-287, December.
  4. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
  5. Onur Kesten, 2010. "School Choice with Consent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 125(3), pages 1297-1348, August.
  6. Varian, Hal R., 1974. "Equity, envy, and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-91, September.
  7. José Alcalde, 1995. "Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 1995-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  8. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001022, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
  10. Aytek Erdil & Haluk Ergin, 2007. "What`s the Matter with Tie-breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice," Economics Series Working Papers 349, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  11. Ergin, Haluk & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2006. "Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 215-237, January.
  12. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Yeon-Koo Che & Yosuke Yasuda, 2011. "Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The "Boston Mechanism" Reconsidered," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 399-410, February.
  13. Sönmez, Tayfun & Pathak, Parag A. & Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Roth, Alvin, 2005. "The Boston Public School Match," Scholarly Articles 2562764, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  14. Martinez, Ruth & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge, 2000. "Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 91-105, March.
  15. Haluk I. Ergin, 2002. "Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2489-2497, November.
  16. Ehlers, Lars & Erdil, Aytek, 2010. "Efficient assignment respecting priorities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 1269-1282, May.
  17. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1954-78, December.
  18. Alvin E. Roth & Uriel G. Rothblum, 1999. "Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets--In Search of Advice for Participants," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 21-44, January.
  19. Roth, Alvin E., 1982. "Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 127-132.
  20. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Molis, Elena, 2011. "Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: The Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-16, September.
  21. José Alcalde Pérez & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2011. "Fair School Placement," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 2011-22, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  22. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2009. "Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources," Boston College Working Papers in Economics, Boston College Department of Economics 717, Boston College Department of Economics.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Lars Ehlers & Isa Hafalir & Bumin Yenmez & Muhammed Yildirim, 2011. "School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business 2012-E20, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  2. Alcalde, Jose & Silva-Reus, José Ángel, 2013. "Allocating via Priorities," QM&ET Working Papers, Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica 13-3, Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica.
  3. Alcalde, Jose & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2014. "Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement," QM&ET Working Papers, Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica 14-1, Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica.
  4. Alcalde, Jose & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2011. "Re-Reforming the Bostonian System: A Novel Approach to the Schooling Problem," MPRA Paper 28206, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Alcalde, José & Subiza, Begoña, 2012. "Affirmative Action and School Choice," QM&ET Working Papers, Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica 12-3, Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica.
  6. YuenLeng Chow & Isa Hafalir & Abdullah Yavas, . "Auctions versus Negotiated Sale: Evidence from Real Estate Sales," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business 2012-E22, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  7. Alcalde, Jose & Subiza, Begoña, 2011. "On Integration Policies and Schooling," MPRA Paper 29145, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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