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Allocating via Priorities

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  • Alcalde, Jose

    ()
    (Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica)

  • Silva-Reus, José Ángel

    ()
    (Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica)

Abstract

We design a mechanism to allocate indivisible objects that combines procedural and distributive fairness. It associates each allocation problem a family of priorities to be used when determining how agents and objects should be matched. The selection of specific priorities, correlated with agents' preferences, guarantees the (ex-ante) equity of the outcome. The analysis of our mechanism, both from the efficiency and the strategic perspectives, enables us to connect the recent literature on random assignment (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001) and the traditional analysis of matching mechanisms (Gale and Shapley, 1962).

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica in its series QM&ET Working Papers with number 13-3.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 11 Jul 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ris:qmetal:2013_003

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Keywords: Correlated Priorities; Random Assignment; Serial Rule; Matching Markets;

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  1. Alcalde, Jose & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2011. "On Stability and Efficiency in School Choice Problems," MPRA Paper 28831, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Katta, Akshay-Kumar & Sethuraman, Jay, 2006. "A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 231-250, November.
  3. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
  4. Alcalde, Jose & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2011. "Re-Reforming the Bostonian System: A Novel Approach to the Schooling Problem," MPRA Paper 28206, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. YIlmaz, Özgür, 2009. "Random assignment under weak preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 546-558, May.
  6. Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January.
  7. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
  8. Ünver, M. Utku & Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu & Hashimoto, Tadashi & Hirata, Daisuke, 2014. "Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
  9. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2001. "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 295-328, October.
  10. YIlmaz, Özgür, 2010. "The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 475-491, July.
  11. Haluk I. Ergin, 2002. "Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2489-2497, November.
  12. Hylland, Aanund & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1979. "The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(2), pages 293-314, April.
  13. Onur Kesten, 2010. "School Choice with Consent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 125(3), pages 1297-1348, August.
  14. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2003. "Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 157-172, September.
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