Dinko Dimitrov (Center and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University) Peter Borm (Center and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University) Ruud Hendrickx (Center and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University) Shao Chin Sung (School of Information Science, Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology)
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In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are considered. It turns out that the first domain restriction guarantees non-emptiness of the strong core and the second domain restriction ensures non-emptiness of the weak core of the corresponding hedonic games. Moreover, an element of the strong core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an element of the weak core under enemies aversion is NP-hard. We examine also the relationship between our domain restrictions and some sufficient conditions for non-emptiness of the core already known in the literature.
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Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number
2004.51.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
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