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Stability in coalition formation games

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Author Info

  • Antonio Romero-Medina

    ()
    (Departamento de Economia, Universidad Carlos III, 28903 Getafe, Spain)

  • Katari´na Cechlárová

    ()
    (Department of Geometry and Algebra, P. J. Safárik University, Jesenná 5, 041 54 Kosice, Slovakia)

Abstract

In the context of coalition formation games a player evaluates a partition on the basis of the set she belongs to. For this evaluation to be possible, players are supposed to have preferences over sets to which they could belong. In this paper, we suggest two extensions of preferences over individuals to preferences over sets. For the first one, derived from the most preferred member of a set, it is shown that a strict core partition always exists if the original preferences are strict and a simple algorithm for the computation of one strict core partition is derived. This algorithm turns out to be strategy proof. The second extension, based on the least preferred member of a set, produces solutions very similar to those for the stable roommates problem.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 29 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 487-494

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2001:i:4:p:487-494

Note: Received August 1998/Final version June 20, 2000
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Related research

Keywords: Coalition formation games · core · stable roommates problem · digraphs · algorithms.;

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Cited by:
  1. Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Unique Stability in Simple Coalition Formation Games," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1537, Econometric Society.
  2. Alison Watts, 2006. "Formation of Segregated and Integrated Groups," Working Papers 2006.127, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  3. Dimitrov, D.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Sung, S.C., 2004. "Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games," Discussion Paper 2004-5, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  4. Alison Watts, 2007. "Formation of segregated and integrated groups," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 505-519, April.
  5. Carmelo Rodríguez Álvarez, 2006. "Strategy-Proof Coalition Formation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2006/11, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  6. Steven J. Brams & Michael A. Jones & D.Marc Kilgour, 2003. "Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters," Working Papers 2003.97, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  7. Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez, 2004. "On the Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Coalition Formation Rules," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(10), pages 1-8.
  8. Shao Sung & Dinko Dimitrov, 2007. "On Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 31-45, February.
  9. Shao Chin Sung & Dinko Dimitrov, 2005. "A taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games," Working Papers 373, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  10. Koji Takamiya, 2013. "Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 115-130, February.

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