Stable Outcomes For Contract Choice Problems
AbstractIn this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose from. We call such problems, cntract choic problems. We provide conditions under which a contract choice problem has a non-empty set of "stable" outcomes. There are two types of stability concepts we study in this paper:cooperative stability and non- cooperative stability. The cooperative stability concept that we invoke here is the core. We also show, that a simple generalization of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with men proposing due to Gale and Shapley(1962), yeilds outcomes for a generalized marriage problem, which necessarily belong to the core. The non-cooperative stability concept that we study here is individual stability. The final result of this paper states that every contract choice problem has a non-empty weak bargaining st.
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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 03 Nov 2003
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stable outcomes; core; individual stability; weak bargaining set; contract choice problem; matching;
Other versions of this item:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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