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A Weak Bargaining Set for Contract Choice Problems

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Somdeb Lahiri (Institute for Financial Management and Research)

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Abstract

In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. The main result of this paper states that every contract choice problem has a non-empty weak bargaining set. The need for such a solution concept which is considerably weaker than the core arises, since it is well known that even for very simple contract choice problems, the core may be empty. We also show by means of an example that the bargaining set due to Mas-Colell (1989), as well as a weaker version of it, may be empty for contract choice problems, thereby implying that the weakening we suggest is in some ways “tight”

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Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2006.19.

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Date of creation: Jan 2006
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.19

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Keywords: Weak bargaining set Contract choice NTU game Matching

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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  1. Klijn, F. & Masso, J., 1999. "Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model," Discussion Paper 114, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Zhou Lin, 1994. "A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 512-526, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Somdeb Lahiri, 2003. "Stable Outcomes For Contract Choice Problems," Game Theory and Information 0311001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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