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A weak bargaining set for contract choice problems

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Author Info
Lahiri, Somdeb

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Research in Economics.

Volume (Year): 61 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 185-190
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Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:61:y:2007:i:4:p:185-190

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622941

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Klijn, F. & Masso, J., 1999. "Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model," Discussion Paper 114, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Zhou Lin, 1994. "A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 512-526, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Somdeb Lahiri, 2003. "Stable Outcomes For Contract Choice Problems," Game Theory and Information 0311001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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