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Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel

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  • Montero, Maria

Abstract

This paper studies non-cooperative bargaining with random proposers in apex games. Two di¤erent protocols are considered: the egalitarian propocol, which selects each player to be the proposer with the same probability, and the proportional protocol, which selects each player with a probability proportional to his number of votes. Expected equilibrium payo¤s coincide with the kernel for the grand coalition regardless of the protocol. Expected payo¤s conditional on a coalition may depend on the protocol: given a coalition of the apex player with a minor player, an egalitarian protocol yields a nearly equal split whereas a proportional protocol leads to a proportional split.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 41 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 309-321

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:41:y:2002:i:2:p:309-321

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. Maschler, Michael, 1992. "The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 18, pages 591-667 Elsevier.
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  11. Serrano, Roberto, 1997. "Reinterpreting the Kernel," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 58-80, November.
  12. Morelli, Massimo & Montero, Maria, 2003. "The demand bargaining set: general characterization and application to majority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 137-155, January.
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  15. Bennett, E. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Demand Commitment Bargaining: -The Case Of Apex Games," Papers, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research 9062, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
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Cited by:
  1. Montero, M.P., 2002. "Two-Stage Bargaining with Reversible Coalitions: The Case of Apex Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2002-26, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Cecilia Testa, 2003. "Government Corruption and Legislative Procedures: is One Chamber Better Than Two?," STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics 41, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  3. Michalis Drouvelis & Maria Montero & Martin Sefton, . "Gaining Power through Enlargement: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York 09/30, Department of Economics, University of York.
  4. Michalis Drouvelis & Maria Montero & Martin Sefton, 2007. "The Paradox of New Members: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2007-06, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  5. Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003," Working Papers 2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  6. Klaus Abbink, 2006. "Majority rip-off in referendum voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 1-21, January.
  7. Maria Montero, 2010. "Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2010-19, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  8. Okada, Akira, 2012. "The Stationary Equilibrium of Three-Person Cooperative Games: A Classification," Discussion Papers 2012-06, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  9. Guillaume Fréchette & John H. Kagel & Massimo Morelli, 2005. "Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1893-1937, November.
  10. Dominik Karos, 2013. "Coalition Formation in General Apex Games," Economics Series Working Papers 680, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  11. Montero, Maria, 2006. "Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 380-397, February.
  12. Okada, Akira, 2007. "Coalitional Bargaining Games with Random Proposers: Theory and Application," Discussion Papers 2007-10, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  13. Dominik Karos, 2012. "Coalition Formation in Generalized Apex Games," Working Papers 2012.38, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  14. Joosung Lee, 2013. "Bargaining and Buyout," 2013 Papers, Job Market Papers ple701, Job Market Papers.
  15. Montero, M.P., 2001. "The Nucleolus as a Consistent Power Index in Noncooerative Majority Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2001-39, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

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